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Selected negotiation process models are presented through this conceptual
work, which proposes to detect and identity those behaviors, processes, and
structures affecting the dynamics of the negotiation process. The factors identified
in this work have been drawn primarily from similar studies exaniining the forces
which promote either competitive or cooperative orientations in negotiators. This
study reports the results of an extensive survey of the literature and interviews of
experts in deciding which of these factors also engender position-based and
interest-based orientations in negotiators. The researcher proposes an original
model which shows that in this dynamic: (1) a specific pattern of cyclical
transactions characterizes the negotiator's orientation, and (2) the parties to a
conflict can be seen as shifting between a position-based orientation and an
interest-based orientation as certain conditions emerge. Additionally, the
researcher's model suggests that negotiation can be defined as a cyclical process of
transactional exchanges among a set of parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs
through social influence. Studies in management, psychology, organizational
behavior, conflict resolution, and systems dynamics provide the theoretical
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A. PURPOSE AND DIRECTION
From contracting to psychology, from marketing to law, theories on
negotiation and conflict resolution have emerged out of a myriad of disciplines.
Contributions from these fields make up much of the largely disjointed body of
literature on negotiation. The major thrust of the literature has been to develop
effective strategies and tactics in negotiation. While "pop psychology" and
popular business works on the tactics and strategies of negotiation abound, these
writings remain distinctly separate from scholarly work. One noted exception is
Roger Fisher's (1991) Getting to Yes, which is both popular and a solid primer for
serious study in negotiation. Another way in which Getting to Yes stands apart
from its popular counterparts is in its advocacy of interest-based negotiations.
This is a departure from the trend of popular books which tend to advocate
position-based tactics and strategies. The intent of this work is to prepare a
framework for existing theories and further studies of interest-based negotiation.
Specifically, the purpose of this work is to detect and identify those behaviors,
processes, and structures which affect the negotiators' tactical orientation: interest-
i based or position-based.
B. SPECIFIC PROBLEM
In negotiations, the parties to a conflict can be seen as shifting between a
competitive orientation and a cooperative orientation in an effort to arrive at the
best approach. The parties' choice of orientation helps determine both how
effectively they will negotiate and the likelihood that they will achieve their
desired outcomes. This research focuses on the motivation behind the shift in
negotiator orientation
1 from position-based to interest-based negotiation. Volumes
1
"Negotiator orientation" generally refers to the negotiator's inclination towards either a competitive or
cooperative approach. In this study, "negotiator orientation" may also indicate the inclinations to use
either interest-based or position-based negotiation.
1
of works on negotiation examine competitive negotiations, cooperative
negotiations, or both, but the needs of this study require this distinction:
competitive sessions are clearly position-based, but cooperative sessions can play
out as either position-based or interest based negotiations. To further illustrate this
distinction, the researcher offers a model (Figure 1). While depicting the cyclical
nature of negotiation, this model underscores the incongruity of the two
approaches. In the distributive cycle, the negotiators focus on positions and react
to their counter-parts' choices. In the integrative cycle, the negotiators focus on
interests and dove-tail their ideas to achieve a mutual agreement. Research in this
area has implications for a contingency-based concept for effective behaviors and
psychological approaches in negotiation.
C. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The researcher has proposed the above model to illustrate a particular
conflict dynamic: where negotiators focus their attention in the negotiation process
in general, and how that focus determines the steps they take in negotiations.
Position-based negotiators focus on their counterpart(s) responses to their actions,
and any change in their counterpart's position. That focus forces the parties to
take the steps in Boyd's Cycle: observation, orientation, decision, action.
Interest-based negotiators focus on the alternatives and options available. That
focus forces the parties to take steps in the dialectic cycle: thesis, antithesis,
synthesis. From this model, we can infer a fundamental axiom about the
negotiation process: negotiation can be seen as a cyclical process of transactional
exchange among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs through social
influence. The model suggests a pathway by which a set of "cross over" factors
has the potential to make any real negotiation vacillate between distributive and
integrative processes. More to the point, the parties can transition from their
concern for their own respective positions to their concern for the underlying
interests involved, or vice-versa. The proposed model serves uniquely as a
Cross-over factors establish an organizational climate somewhere along
the continuum. This climate influences negotiator orientation, which
determines the negotiators' focus, which reinforces the climate until some








steps are the focus of
position-based orientation
(from Boyd's Cycle)
The Integrative Cycle's steps
are the focus of the interest-
based orientation
(from the Dialectic Cycle)
Figure 1. Cyclical Model of Transactional Exchange
(proposed by the researcher)
process-concern for their own respective positions to their concern for the
underlying interests involved, or vice-versa. The proposed model serves uniquely
as a process-focus model, since it highlights the differences between the focus of a
position-based negotiation and the focus of an interest-based negotiation. Other
models, such as Thomas' (1976) conflict resolution model, do a better job of
outlining the generic phases of an episode in a negotiation; however, the proposed
model melds the process to the differing approaches—interests versus positions.
The proposed model implies that our actions not only affect the size of the pie or
the size of the slice, but the choice the other person makes—whether to "grow the
pie" or opt for a larger share of the existing pie. Our understanding of the factors
affecting negotiator orientation allows us to plan and employ more effective
behaviors in negotiation. In other words, we can make sure that our behavior
elicits the most favorable response from our counter-part. We can make sure that
our counter-parts cooperate if we want them to cooperate; compete, if we want
them to compete. We may be better able to ensure that they focus on positions or
interests as we see fit. Negotiators who understand the dynamics of these "cross-
over" factors—the antecedents, the specific behaviors, and the effects—can use
leadership to optimize their outcomes in a negotiation. The focus of the proposed
thesis is these cross-over factors.
1. Primary Research Question
To what extent do cross-over factors between distributive and integrative
negotiation processes exist and how might such factors affect negotiator
orientation?
The researcher has applied the phrase "cross-over" factors after receiving feedback from Robert Barrios-
Choplin, Ph.D., of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Professor Barrios-Choplin attributes this phrase,
"cross-over" factors, to the concepts outlined in Doc Lew Childre's Cut Thru , Boulder Creek, Calif:
Planetary Publications, date unknown.
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What are distributive and integrative negotiations?
b. Do negotiations vacillate between the distributive and integrative
cycles of the model?
c. Does a set of common cross-over factors exist?
d. What are the antecedents to these cross-over factors?
e. How might knowledge of these factors assist in understanding
negotiator orientation?
3. Rationale for Pursuing the Question
The behavioral undeipinnings of negotiation are perhaps the least
developed area of negotiation research. Furthermore, negotiation theory is
relatively disjointed, addressing a broad array of practical venues for negotiators,
such as legal, national security, labor, etc. It does not address the processes which
these venues have in common. Furthermore, much of the relevant theoretical work
has been developed by the academic research of game theorists and conflict
management theorists. The researcher proposes to identify factors affecting
negotiator orientation and behavior. Research in this area could offer valuable
practical information for negotiators wanting to know the most effective behaviors
and psychological approaches to support their strategic aims in negotiations. In
other words, when negotiators understand whether the identified factors will foster
either the position-based or the interest-based approach from their counterpart,
they can employ the most effective tactical and strategic behaviors in negotiations.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The main intent of this study is to identify the factors affecting negotiator
orientation. As such, the review of the literature encompasses research in
management, marketing, conflict resolution and gaming, organizational behavior,
and social psychology. Collectively, these disciplines applied a plethora of
behavioral concepts and yielded the prospective list of factors, the "cross-over"
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factors, which are offered to foster insight into the primary research question. The
sparse academic research on interest-based negotiation placed a major limitation
on this study. Most of the published research addresses cooperative negotiation,
not interest-based negotiation. To finally derive the cross-over factors, results
were gleaned from the body of research predicting a cross-over between
competitive and cooperative approaches, not position- and interest-based.
Typically, the next step in research of this type would be to validate, or
challenge, the findings presented in the literature review in an experiment;
however, an examination of each of the several cross-over factors may have
required as many as 27 experiments. The field studies or field observations
methodology is commonly used in this type of research and would have offered an
ideal approach to the problem of examining the many cross-over factors in the
natural setting of a negotiation. Unfortunately, the lack of opportunities to observe
true interest-based negotiations made this approach impractical. To further identify
and analyze the cross-over factors required the more qualitative research
techniques. To answer the position- to interest-based question, the researcher
simply asked the "experts." Specifically, the researcher asked experts from
various related fields to validate a set of statements regarding the cross-over
factors. In other words, the survey of the literature offered several specific results
on cooperative negotiations in certain settings which may or may not be
generalizable to interest-based negotiations as a whole. The expert interviews
offered a means of achieving consensus from people who may have had the
opportunity to do the type of field studies and field observations that this
researcher could not. This approach to creating a list of cross-over factors relies
heavily on one basic assumption: "that knowledge about human behavior can be
gained by the traditional method of interlacing theoretical deductions with
controlled observations." (Rapoport, p. v.)
This survey of literature on negotiations, synthesis of relevant behavioral
concepts, and analysis of specific factors affecting negotiator orientation are
within the scope of this thesis. The generalizations made in this study stem from
specific findings which may or may not apply when conditions differ from the
original experiment. The underlying assumption about the negotiation process was
stated as an axiom in section C above: negotiation can be seen as a cyclical
process of transactional exchange among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of
needs through social influence.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I presents the purpose and direction of the study, addresses the
specific problem of the research, and outlines the objective of this work. This
introductory chapter further lists the research questions, presents the rationale for
pursuing these questions, and establishes the scope, limitation, and assumptions of
the work. Chapter I also presents the researcher's model, which is a construct
illustrating the relationships between negotiator orientation and specific patterns of
transactional exchanges. In order to discuss the principal terms in the context of
the various theories and disciplines, the principal terms are defined in Chapter II.
Chapter II addresses the research question: What are distributive and
integrative negotiations? It presents the definitions of principal terms and the
history and systems of theories which this thesis relates to the negotiation process;
in other words, Chapter II establishes the pedigree of ideas. This chapter outlines
key theories in competitive gaming and mixed motive (cooperative versus
competitive) theory, and interest-based negotiation. It presents the cyclical
components of the researcher's model: Boyd's Cycle and the dialectic cycle.
Chapter HI addresses the research question: do negotiations vacillate
between the distributive and integrative cycles of the model? This chapter
provides an explanation and analysis of several process models which suggest
mechanisms through which negotiators change their orientation. Additionally, this
chapter places March and Simon's taxonomy of the Organizational Reactions to
Conflict along a continuum, which represents the third component of the
researcher's proposed model.
Chapter IV addresses the research question: does a set of common cross-
over factors exist? It outlines a set of factors thought to affect negotiator
orientation. These cross-over factors were drawn primarily from "A Framework
for Understanding the Choice of Conflict Resolution Methods" (Dant & Schul,
1992), "Negotiation Strategies: Different Strokes for Different Folks" (Johnston,
1982), relevant research findings, and key factors drawn from the models
presented in Chapter III.
Chapter V addresses the research question: what are the antecedents of the
cross-over factors? This chapter considers certain incentive systems and "Eight
Personality Characteristics" (Hermann & Kogan, 1977) to examine the antecedents
of the cross-over factors.
Chapter VI addresses the research question: how might knowledge of these
factors assist in understanding negotiator orientation? This chapter presents
several concepts from social psychology, cognitive psychology, game theory, and
systems theory as they relate to the models presented in Chapter III.
Chapter VTI presents the conclusions and recommendations. This chapter
considers the implications for the researcher's model. It makes recommendations
concerning professional training and organizational systems that are designed to
influence negotiator orientation. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the answers to
the primary and secondary research questions and offers suggestions for further
research.
H. SURVEY OF SYSTEMS OF NEGOTIATION
A. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. A Framework for the Scope and Methodology
This chapter outlines selected theories and models which present a set of
emergent patterns relating to negotiator orientation. In the language of systems
theory, this chapter presents key process maps, flow charts, and other illustrations
of theoretical constructs used to represent the complex arrangements and
relationships involved in negotiations. (Checkland, 1981) The holism of systems
thinking is better able than the reductionism 1 of the scientific method to provide a
useful framework in which to examine the continuous salvo of transactions
conducted at the negotiations table. The systems approach examines interrelations
by constructing models which embody various degrees of complexity. The
scientific approach typically involves experimentation to determine cause and
effect relationships by controlling variables. This approach is limited in its ability
to explain, predict, or control the complex set of psychological factors inherent in
negotiations. On the other hand, the scientific approach can produce empirical
evidence that these systems models are indeed useful. This study draws from
research using both approaches; however, the systems approach predominates as
the foundation for the framework of this chapter.
The negotiation process plays itself out as a pattern of cyclical exchanges
contained within a systematic arrangement of events. The Sawyer-Guetzkow
1
Reductionism affirms the view that a researcher can (and should) examine a problem by studying its
component parts and drawing conclusions about the whole from these findings. It is one of three
characteristics of the scientific method, the other two are repeatability, and refutation. "We may reduce
the complexity of the variety of the real world in experiments whose results are validated by their
repeatability, and we may build knowledge by the refutation of hypothesis." (Checkland, 1981, p. 51)
Checkland goes further to contrast the reductionism of the traditional scientific methodology with the
holism of systems thinking. Relevant to this research is the ability of the holistic approach of systems
thinking to detect and explain emerging patterns not apparent when we reduce complex systems to their
component parts.
negotiation model (see Figure 2) outlines and maps these events in negotiations.
Arising out of a decision model depicting the phases of international conflict
resolution, the Sawyer-Guetzkow model characterizes negotiation as a series of
activities that precede, parallel, and follow bargaining-at-the-table. (Karass, 1968,
pp. 21-22) Described within the framework of the Sawyer-Guetzkow model, this
study focuses on factors which cause negotiators to change their respective
orientations from position-based to interest-based and vice versa—factors which












Figure 2. Stages of Negotiation (Sawyer-Guetzkow, 1958)
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2. The Framework for the Primary Research Question
The researcher's model in Figure 1 depicts the cross-over dynamic as a
continuum of organizational approaches to handling conflict. The model suggests
that the cyclical patterns of transactional exchanges are different on either end of
the continuum. It further suggests that a set of cross-over factors can foster a
change in the organization's approach to handling conflict. The cross-over factors
are conditions which affect the process of bargaining "at the table" by bringing
about a shift from position-based negotiation to interest-based negotiation, or vice
versa. As we will read later in this chapter, several experiments have shown that
factors exist to engender a related cross-over: the shift between competitive and
cooperative negotiation. While these experiments generally follow reductionism 's
approach to creating knowledge, they do enhance this study by introducing
empirical evidence that certain factors can engender the cross-over in negotiator
orientation which is central to the research question. Since the researcher's model
sets up the framework for the existence of cross-over factors, this chapter
compares the components of this model to other well established theories and
models. The next section of this chapter first addresses the notion that
negotiations follow a cyclical pattern of transactional exchanges, and then offer a
model which outlines the various orientations.
B. CYCLICAL PATTERNS CHARACTERIZING NEGOTIATOR
ORIENTATION
1. Thomas' Model of Dyadic Conflict Episodes
In Kenneth Thomas's (1990) Model of Dyadic Conflict Episodes, he
illustrated the basic component of the negotiation process as a pattern of sub-
processes having both linear and cyclical properties. These sub-processes
(episodes) and their components are shown in Figure 3. The episodes of a
negotiation are comprised of six basic phases: awareness, thoughts and emotions,
intentions, behavior, other's reaction, and outcomes. (Thomas, 1990, pp. 664-667)
11
Awareness emerges when one party perceives that another party can, to some
degree, control the one's ability to attain a goal. In Thomas's words, "Conflicts
appear to stem from one party's perception that another party frustrates the
satisfaction of one of its concerns." (Thomas, 1976, pp. 900) Following
awareness, the party's thoughts and emotions generate both normative (or value)
and rational (or payoff) judgments. In other words, thoughts and emotions emerge
which cause the parties to consider how they feel about the other party and about
specific aspects of the agreement. As thoughts and emotions arise, the parties will
make some estimate of the benefit of a potential payoff. Here, the normative and
rational judgments may be in conflict. For example, a person might make the
rational judgment that "$37,000 is the best price I've been offered to buy this Jeep
Cherokee." However, this person's emotional, normative judgment might suggest
that "no one should pay more than $35,000 for a car." In this case, the normative
and rational judgments present an internal conflict for the party involved. The
party then forms intentions regarding the issue, considers options, looks for
opportunities to bargain, and accepts some pattern of conflict of interest—all or
none, zero-sum game, win-win, unresolvable—which best fits his or her awareness
or conceptualization. (Thomas, 1976) The party then behaves according to his or
her intentions. This Behavior represents the fundamental activity in negotiation.
Other's reaction represents the counterpart's behavior in a negotiation. As the
Thomas model shows, negotiation becomes a cyclical process as the parties begin
to exert mutual influence on the other's behavior and on their conceptualizations
of the issues at stake.
In Thomas's (1976) earlier publication, he represented the behavioral event as having three components:
orientation, strategic objectives, and tactical behavior. These components of behavior mirror three of the
four components of the competitive cycle (Figure 5 in next subsection): orientation matches orientation,
strategic objectives matches decision, and tactical behavior matches action. Thomas's behavioral event
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Figure 3. Process Model of Conflict Episodes (Thomas, 1990)
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Thomas also discusses the parties' propensity to increase or decrease the level of
assertiveness, aggression, and even hostility. The other's reaction provides key
feedback to the cognitive processes involved in deciding how to interact. Other's
reaction constitutes the feedback loop in a cyclical process of continuous
behavioral interaction until some agreement is reached. The final event, outcome,
represents the parties' coming to some resolution. The parties may resolve to
make some formal agreement, a tacit agreement, or no agreement at all.
Thomas' model supports the idea that negotiation can be seen as a cyclical
process of transactional exchanges among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of
needs through social influence. Beyond the Thomas model, negotiations can also
be described as having competitive/distributive (Carver, 1995, Tip. 7) qualities or
cooperative/integrative (Carver, 1995, Tip. 9) qualities. The characteristics of the
transactional exchanges vary according to the mix of negotiators or the phase of
negotiations. In either case—negotiator type or negotiation phase—the transactional
exchanges among parties follows a cyclical process of interaction. While the
Thomas model depicts conflict management as a linear process made of episodes,
the researcher's model explains negotiation as a cyclical process of transactional
exchanges based on Boyd's Cycle and the Dialectic Cycle. This approach
emphasizes the different nature of competitive and cooperative, or interest-based
versus position-based interactions. The next two subsections compare the
negotiation process to these cycles, respectively.
The topic of aggression is developed more fully in Chapter III, Section G, Subsection 2 in the context of
Thomas and Kilmann's Model of Five Conflict Handling Modes. Since Thomas and Kilmann present a
dual concern model which suggests that negotiators can exhibit high assertiveness together with high
cooperation, the topic of assertiveness is further addressed as an optimum level of force on a continuum.
This continuum includes forms of aggression and passiveness.
14
2. The Patterns of Conflict and Competitive Transactions
In competitive exchanges, the negotiation follows a pattern similar to all
competition. Through his pioneering thesis, "The Nature of Conflict4," Colonel
John Boyd, USAF (Ret.), articulated the dynamics of the archetypal pattern of
conflict. From his experience as a combat pilot in Korea, he recognized the
cyclical nature of actions and responses in aerial combat and developed his




his work applies in business, economics, and other non-military
applications including negotiations. Lind cites the crux of the theory behind
Boyd's cycle as follows:
Conflict can be seen as a series of time-competitive observation-
orientation-decision-action cycles. Each party to a conflict
[negotiation] begins by observing. He observes himself, his physical
surroundings and his enemy. On the basis of his observation, he
orients, that is to say, he makes a mental image or "snapshot" of his
situation. On the basis of this orientation, he makes a decision. He
puts the decision into effect, i.e., he acts. Then because he assumes
his action has changed the situation, he observes again..." (Lind,
1985, p. 5)
We can illustrate the dynamics of the competitive/distributive processes of
negotiations by using Boyd's Cycle or the Observation-Orientation-Decision-
Action (OODA) loop (see Figure 4). The parties to a negotiation observe the
behaviors of their counterparts, specifically focusing on verbal and non-verbal
communications. The negotiators then orient or evaluate these communications
4
"The Nature of Conflict" is the title of the five hour oral treatise which Col. Body delivered over a period
ofyears to explain the theory of maneuver warfare.
5
In 1993, the author first recognized the similarity of competition in negotiation and warfare and used
Boyd's cycle to illustrate this point. Similarly, Hearn (1996, pp. 202-3) developed a framework for
competitive negotiation from the nine "Principles of War." Participants who act competitively in a
negotiation can be seen as working through this conflict cycle which contains elements similar to those of
the Thomas model illustrated above. Theorists disagree over the distinctions to be made between
competition and conflict, but this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
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against various mental models or ways of understanding the world. Based on the
negotiators' mental models, they then decide what the observed behavior or
communication meant. They decide what issues to address—respective goals, the
negotiation process, prospective outcomes, conditions, or rules of the game. They
decide on the manner of addressing specific issues: to accept or to contest. Based
on their experience, the negotiators take some action in hopes of bringing about a
desired effect. The negotiators again observe and again repeat the cycle, thereby
executing a series of exchanges to fit some tactical purpose; thereby executing a
set of tactical schemes to carry out some overall strategy. As this discussion of
Boyd's cycle has shown, relevant theories sprang forth from various quarters. The
development of the game theorists' school of thought brought out a framework by





Figure 4. Boyd's Cycle (The OODA Loop) (Lind, 1985)
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The question of negotiator orientation was first framed by game theory
which examined the choice of strategies in mixed mode games: games in which the
participants could chose either to compete or to cooperate. The game theorists had
discovered that strategists (or negotiators) often faced a dilemma as they worked to
maximize their payoffs. In a certain set of problems, the participants chose to
compete by selecting their dominant strategy, the strategy which yields the best
outcome regardless of the opponent's choice. However, in the mixed mode
problem, participants typically found that by competing and selecting their
dominant strategy, they secured a lower payoff than they would have by
cooperating. This problem gave rise to many studies in mixed mode strategies.
Mixed motive games provided the framework for many researcher experiments.
Some of the more prevalent of these "Collective Action Dilemma Problems"
(Goetz, 1994, p. 60) are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, the
Public Goods Provision Games, and "Chicken."
In the classic prisoner's dilemma, two participants, Prisoner A and Prisoner
B, are given two options or strategies. (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Dixit and
Nalebuff, 1991) (see Figure 5 below) Strategy one is do not confess; strategy two
is confess. For any combination of strategies, each prisoner's payoff is shown
below in the matrix. Prisoner A receives the value on the left of the virgule (/),
Prisoner B, the value on the right. So for example, if Prisoner A confesses and






Do not confess 3/3 1/25
Confess 25/1 10/10
Figure 5. The Prisoner's Dilemma
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In another similar example, suppose a couple is negotiating a divorce settlement.
Instead of "do not confess," let option one be "do not retain counsel"; option two,
"retain counsel." Let the pay off matrix represent the amount of debt each couple
carries after the divorce. As most divorcing couples discover, the prisoner's
dilemma has real implications: the vast majority of couples elect the pareto
inefficient Nash solution and retain attorneys. The prisoner's dilemma and
similarly designed mixed mode games provided the framework for decades of
empirical research into the question of what factors engender either the
competitive or cooperative orientation. The primary assumption for most game
theorists is that the participants will compete rationally to maximize their payoffs.
Given that a certain payoff matrix does not reward cooperation, the game
theorists' rational view would always prescribe competition for that particular
game. From this view, cooperation for cooperation's sake was seen as a "soft" and
generally less effective approach. What confounded many researchers of mixed
mode game problems was the fact that human beings often fail to pursue the so-
called rational course. The other short-coming of the game theorists' school of
thought is that it engendered an either/or view of negotiation: either cooperate or
compete. Despite this fallacy of bifurcation, the game theorists established a
somewhat useful framework in which to examine negotiator orientation. Many
publications use this framework or some modification as their point of departure.
For example, as his title suggests, Robert W. Johnston (1982) presents a modified
framework in his "Three Modes of Negotiating Behavior and Their Predicted
Results: Competitive, Collaborative, and Subordinative." Johnston's model draws
a unique distinction between two types of cooperative orientations: collaborative
and subordinative. In the collaborative orientation, both parties act cooperatively
yet assertively, that is to say, they act to achieve the desires of both parties. In the
subordinative orientation, one party acts cooperatively and unassertively.
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Subordinative negotiators respond to the other parties' needs at the expense of
their own.
Deutsch (1949, 1973, 1980) proposed a useful way to distinguish
cooperative and competitive contexts. In cooperation, people believe that their
goals are positively related; one's goal attainment helps others reach their goals.
In competition, they believe that their goals are negatively related; they can
achieve their goals only to the extent that others fail to achieve theirs. In
independence, goals are unrelated; one's goal accomplishment neither facilitates
nor frustrates other's goals. Deutsch theorized that how people believe their goals
are related greatly affects the dynamics and outcomes of interaction. These goal
interdependencies are pure types, and perhaps most often situations have a mix of
linked goals. (Lindskold, Betz & Walters, 1986, p. 100) This "mix of linked (but
often undisclosed) goals" presents the fundamental challenge for the negotiator
who attempts to game the process without considering the underlying
psychological issues: needs and motivation. Even if disclosed, certain underlying
motives often go ignored as seemingly trivial matters by one party, while these
motives hold primary importance to the other. So often this is the reason behind
the apparently irrational behavior of our counterparts.
3. The Patterns of Integrative Transactions
In integrative exchanges, the negotiation follows a pattern similar to the
dialectic cycle—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (see Figure 6). Like the
competitive or distributive process, the integrative process contains clearly
definable cognitive phases, i.e., phases which distinctly outline the negotiator's
mental focus. Thesis represents the negotiator's interests; antithesis represents the
negotiator's understanding of the other party's interest. The integrative action
begins with the work of clearly identifying the set of substantive interests that each
party brings to the table. (Fisher, 1991, p. 1 1) Negotiators then work to dovetail or
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integrate their privately held interests into a set of mutual interests. Roger Fisher
of the Harvard Negotiation Project has outlined, analyzed, and prescribed the
integrative approach to negotiations in several publications. In Getting to Yes, the
first of his popularly marketed series, Fisher (1991, p. 68) developed a model (see
Figure 7) which details four basic steps in inventing options: problem, analysis,
approach, and action ideas. In the first of these steps toward inventing options or
achieving synthesis, the negotiators view the problem as what's wrong in the real
world. In the second step, analysis, they consider what's wrong in theory. In the
third step, they devise an approach based on their analysis; they ask what might be
done in theory. Finally, in the fourth step, action ideas represent what might be
done in the real world. While Fisher's four step model provides better descriptive
details for the integrative process, the dialectic cycle provides a more suitable
archetype for the transactional exchanges between interest-based negotiators.









Observe what is lacking
Note barriers to resolving
the problem
















Generate broad idea about
what might be done
Step IV. Action Ideas
What might be done?
What specific steps
might be taken to
deal with the
problem?
Figure 7. Four Basic Steps in Invention Options (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991)
This interest-based school of thought has emerged as a result of decades of
research and publications from the Harvard Negotiation Project. The concept of
interest-based negotiation, sometimes referred to as "Win-Win" or principled
negotiation, represents a departure from the game theorists' view. Where the
game theory paradigm established negotiator orientation as competitive versus
cooperative, the Harvard paradigm offers a new dichotomy: position-based versus
interest-based. Interest-based negotiation is an approach to bargaining which
focuses on the basic need or underlying concern that is addressed by a proposal.
In contrast, position-based negotiation focuses on a "position, proposal, or chosen
solution to a particular problem, or goal." (Collective Bargaining Reporter, Fall
21
1995) Interest-based negotiation requires its participants to produce 'alternative
solutions to the problem as a means of putting together the most attractive package
for all concerned." (Williams, 1983, p. 70) The four part method which Roger
Fisher (1991) prescribed in Getting to Yes entails (a) 'separating the people from
the problem," (b) 'focusing on interests, not positions," (c) 'inventing options for
mutual gain," and (d) 'insisting on using objective criteria." Interest-based
negotiation can be further defined as problem-solving dialogue6 where parties
cooperate by pooling efforts to uncover information, develop alternatives
independent of the degree to which outcomes serve self-interests, then agree on an
alternative which is best for each party and for the relationship as a whole. The
interest-based approach is characteristically cooperative, but also distinguished by
aspect which are not essential to a cooperative negotiation, (see Figure 8 below)
Focuses on underlying issues
Examines set of needs directly (position-based seeks need
fulfillment by achieving certain desired positions)
Exhibits mutual problem-solving behavior
Does not advocate positions/outcomes to serve self-interest in early
stages
Stresses seeking, assembling, and sharing of information
Places emphasis on developing new alternatives/use of dialogue
Acts assertive in selecting favorable alternative; good for self &
relationship
Proceeds independent of trust
Figure 8: Distinguishing Characteristics of Interest-based Negotiation
(Proposed by the researcher)
It is important to draw this fundamental distinction between dialogue and conventional discussion.
Having the same roots as the words 'concussion' and 'percussion,' discussion connotes the process of
beating, i.e., beating an idea into someone else's head. Dialogue, on the other hand, stems from the Greek
words dia for 'through' and logos for 'words.' Dialogue is a synergistic activity through which the
exchange of ideas yields knowledge not previously held by constituents. For a better understanding of the
value of dialogue, read Senge (1990, pp. 238-49). 'The purpose of a dialogue is to go beyond any one
individual's understanding" (Senge, 241)
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Interest-based negotiation is often confused with cooperative negotiation.
Some writers characterize both approaches as 'fcoft" and vulnerable to the tactics
of the competitive negotiator who feigns cooperation. The best safeguard for the
interest-based negotiator is to follow Fisher's (1988) guidelines of Unconditionally
Constructive Behavior (Figure 9 below) and to develop a Best Alternative To a
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) before every negotiation. (Fisher, 1991, pp. 97-
106) The BATNA is the negotiator's 'Walk-away" alternative, i.e., it represents
what the negotiator will do if he or she cannot achieve a better bargain at the table.
Before entering into a negotiation, it is prudent to improve the BATNA to the
extent possible.





Balance emotion with An irrational battle is less I make fewer mistakes,
reason. likely.
2. Try to understand. The better I understand you, The less I shoot in the dark,
the fewer collisions we will the better solutions I can
have. invent and the better able I
am to influence you.
3. Inquire, consult, and We both participate in I reduce the risk of making a
listen making decisions. Better mistake without giving up
communication improves the ability to decide,
them.
4. Be reliable. It tends to build trust and My words will have more
confidence. impact.
5. Be open to persuasion; If people are persuaded By being open, I keep
try to persuade rather than coerced, both learning; it is easier to resist
the outcome and compliance coercion if one is open to
are better. persuasion.
6. Accept the other as To deal well with our By dealing with you and
worth dealing with and differences, I have to deal reality, I remove obstacles
learning from. with you and have an open to learning the facts and to
mind. persuading you on the
merits.
Figure 9. Unconditionally Constructive Behavior
(Fisher & Brown, 1989)
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In theory, where competition often yields the pareto inefficient Nash
solution, the interest-based approach finds the pareto efficient solution. (Dixit and
Nalebuff, 1991) It achieves this pareto efficient solution by communicating
underlying interests, seeking to dove-tail these interests, and working together to
solve the jointly-owned problem. For example, suppose a newly hired pre-school
teacher has re-entered the workforce. She begins to negotiate the terms of her
employment from this position: she demands a wage of $7.50 an hour and free
admission for her pre-school aged child. The pre-school ao^ninistrator takes a
different position: she offers $7.50 and no free admission. After some discussion,
the newly hired teacher airs her concern for cutting her overall costs. The new job
requires a new wardrobe and more meals away from home; it brings increased tax
liability and child care costs, etc. She adds that her husband's recent raise moves
the family into a much higher tax bracket. Coupled with her new tax liability and
new expenses, her new teaching position becomes a money-losing proposition.
The administrator now discusses some of the tax implications which the couple
might have overlooked. Considering the large tax deduction the couple will
receive for day care expenses, the teacher and the administrator realize an
opportunity for a pareto efficient solution. The Preschool gets its tuition, and the
teacher gets her "free day care," courtesy of the U.S. Government tax refund.
Interest-based negotiation underscores the importance of long-term
relationships. As Fisher (1991) states when prescribing "Win-Win or no deal," we
either look out for both parties, or we refuse to deal. To do otherwise is to
undermine the long-term relationship and establish an adversarial future; to do
otherwise is to force the participants towards the pareto inefficient Nash solutions
at which competitors fight to maximize their payoffs. The following subsection
draws further distinctions between competitive and position-based negotiations
and between cooperative and interest-based negotiations.
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C. ORIENTATION AND POSITIONING
According to Williams (1983), at the outset of negotiations, negotiators
adopt an orientation which supports one of three positional modes: a maximalist
position, equitable position, and integrative position. The maximalist position is
characteristically competitive and position-based. This position assumes a zero
sum game. From the maximalist position, participants assume that they maximize
their payoffs by making extreme initial demands. The equitable position is
characteristically position-based, yet cooperative. The central concerns here are
equity and fairness through compromise. From the equitable position, participants
assume that they can best respond to one another's needs by making equal
concessions on their positional demands and accepting lower payoffs. The
integrative position is characteristically cooperative and interest-based. In contrast
to the equitable position, the integrative position or approach is a problem-solving
approach. Driven by its interest-based aspects, it seeks to resolve the underlying
problems in order to achieve the pareto efficient solution. In Figure 10 below, the
researcher offers a Venn diagram to draw distinctions between competitive and
position-based, cooperative and interest-based. Thus the value of Williams'
taxonomy in this discussion is its usefulness as a framework to compare and
contrast the two orientations presented, namely the competitive versus cooperative
orientations, and position- versus interest-based orientations. Again, the position-
based sphere overlaps the cooperative sphere because some negotiations (the
equitable position) can be characterized as both position-based and cooperative.
That part of the position-based sphere outside of the cooperative sphere represents
the most competitive region (the maximalist position), where cooperation is low
and differences in positions are seen as fixed. Conversely, that part of the
cooperative sphere outside of the position-based sphere represents the most
integrative region (the integrative position), where cooperation is high and
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differences are not seen as fixed to positions. This representation of interest-based
and position-based against the researcher's model based on William's taxonomy
helps show that negotiations can take on hybrid forms. Negotiations are not
either/or propositions; interest-based or position-based. Rather, negotiations are
characterized by certain qualities which can be shown along a continuum generally
reflecting purely position-based approaches on one end versus purely interest-











Integrative or interest-based negotiation is a distinct subset of cooperative
negotiation. It involves a high degree of informational exchange aimed at mutual
problem-solving. It is characterized by interactions which facilitate relatively
higher levels of trust than would be found in other negotiations. Trust is not a
requirement of integrative negotiations; however, those actions typical in
integrative negotiations generally promote trust. Cooperative negotiations entail a
broad set of negotiations where parties accommodate their counterparts' efforts to
explore their own needs. In cooperative negotiations, the parties are more open to
persuasion. In distributive or position-based negotiations, parties typically focus
on some plan of action or objective to fulfill their sets of needs. The effort to
secure some agreement focuses on these objectives, or positions, and not on the
parties' overall concerns or interests. Again, in position-based negotiations,
parties can work either cooperatively or competitively. Cooperative position-
based negotiators typically view differences as fixed, focus on securing objectives
to meet end goals, allow for their counterparts' efforts to pursue their own
objectives, and expect that fair agreements can be achieved through compromise.
Just as the more cooperative negotiators might, competitive position-based
negotiators typically view differences as fixed and focus on securing objectives to
meet end goals. However, competitive position-based negotiators see the
agreement as the conclusion of some zero sum contest and focus on maximizing
the gains from their own objectives.
Chapter HI presents a series of models which suggest that negotiations can
shift between position- and interest-based approaches, or more accurately,
vacillate in some real sense between the two pure ideals represented on an interest-
based/position-based continuum. The researcher's model places the taxonomy
offered by March and Simon (1958) along such a continuum.
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in. MODELS REPRESENTING THE DYNAMICS IN NEGOTIATOR
ORIENTATION
The theories and models presented in this chapter outline and illustrate
certain dynamics relating to negotiator orientation. Several theories specifically
address the competitive to cooperative shift in orientation. As this chapter outlines
the selected theories and models, the reader should also consider the validity of
these models in depicting the shift in orientation from interest-based to position-
based negotiation. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine those models
and concepts which suggest that negotiations vacillate between the distributive and
integrative cycles of the researcher's model.
A. MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL REACTION TO CONFLICT
March and Simon (1958, p. 129-131) presented their taxonomy of
Organizational Reaction to Conflict which proposed four ways organizations deal
with conflict: problem-solving, persuading, bargaining, and politicking.
According to March and Simon, when problem-solving
(PROBSOLV) is evident, the participants to the dispute are seen as a
priori sharing common objectives and involving themselves in a high
risk but integrative process of identifying a solution that satisfies
both parties' criteria. Though no prerequisites to PROBSOLV, trust
and cooperation between the parties are likely to be evident (Clopton
1984).... In the use of persuasion (PERSUADE) to resolve conflicts,
each party is seen as attempting to alter the other party's perspective
or decision criteria relating to the focal issue(s). In effect, the aim is
to reduce differences in participant subgoals. The critical difference
between PERSUADE and PROBSOLV is the former's "persuasive"
intent; that is, the focus is on moving the other party toward a
common set of goals.... Under the bargaining (BARGAIN) scenario,
common goals are not expected. Indeed, disagreements over
objectives are viewed as fixed.... In applying politics (POLITIC),
though the parties enact behaviors based on a BARGAIN format,
there is an assumption of fixed disagreement over goals and a zero-
sum orientation. (Dant & Schul, pp. 39-40)
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In contrast to subsequent models, March and Simon's taxonomy has placed
conflict handling "reactions" into four categories instead of setting up a continuum
or gradient of reactions, i.e., a competitive to neutral to cooperative continuum.
Another unique feature of the March and Simon taxonomy is in its focus on
organizational reaction (a systems view). This organizational concern differs from
the concerns of subsequent theories which examined personality traits and other
specific factors. March and Simon's model stands out as a taxonomy of conflict
management processes, yet we can use their theory to explain the behaviors
observed in negotiations as taking place along a strategic continuum.
1
The theory
of Organizational Reaction to Conflict presents an extremely effective framework
in which to examine the "shades of gray" between the two polar opposites of the
continuum: position-based and interest-based.
B. TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY
Tit-for-Tat is essentially the strategy of an "eye for an eye," or quid pro
quo. Tit-for-Tat begins by seeking the highest payoff through a series of mutually
cooperative transactions, thus the Tit-for-Tat player will begin a negotiation by
playing cooperatively. In each subsequent transaction, the Tit-for-Tat player deals
cooperatively in response to the other participant's cooperation; competitively with
the other's competitiveness, i.e., it repays tit for tat. The underlying principle of
Tit-for-Tat is that of behaviorism. Specifically, Tit-for-Tat employs both positive
and negative reinforcement of behavior. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991, p. 107) credit
Anatol Rapoport with having devised a winning computer model which used the
Tit-for-Tat Strategy. The Tit-for-Tat strategy is effective in preventing the other
side from exploiting us, while allowing us the flexibility to respond cooperatively
to their cooperative behaviors. Tit-for-Tat is, however, a follower strategy, i.e.,
the Tit-for-Tat player reacts to the other. Since the Tit-for-Tat strategy sets us up
The researcher's model (Figure 1) incorporates this approach
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to react competitively to competitive signals, our misinterpretation of our
counterpart's behavior may cause us to compete when cooperation is more
appropriate. Accordingly, if our counterpart uses Tit-for-Tat and misinterprets our
behavior, he or she may react inappropriately. "No matter what strategy you
choose, you cannot have any effect on what your partner sees.'" (Dixit and
Nalebuff, 1991, p. 112) Tit-for-Tat is fundamentally a position-based strategy
which falls short of effectiveness because it misses an opportunity for leadership
in negotiations. Specifically, Tit-for-Tat provides no positive incentive or trust-
building, which might lead our counterpart to shift from competitive behavior and
become more cooperative. Said another way, Tit-for-Tat fails to acknowledge that
human interaction is far more complex than its—stimulus-response, reward and
punishment—behaviorist's underpinnings imply. The Tit-for-Tat strategy not only
falls short in the normative judgments of many negotiators, it also fails their
rational judgments because it abdicates the leadership and risk-taking necessary to
create an opportunity to build a cooperative climate.
C. GRADUATED AND RECIPROCATED INITIATIVE IN TENSION
REDUCTION
Charles Osgood (1962) proposed Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in
Tension reduction (GRIT) as a more sophisticated version of Tit-for-Tat.
Negotiators following the GRIT approach begin by communicating their intentions
to deal cooperatively. As with Tit-for-Tat, GRIT negotiators punish uncooperative
behavior; however, GRIT negotiators reiterate their intentions to deal
cooperatively after each punishment. Following punishment and reiteration, GRIT
negotiators resume the process of dealing cooperatively. Along with the same
behaviorist principles used in Tit-for-Tat, GRIT incorporates some persuasive
intent, but this persuasive element is incomplete.
2
Consequent to this need for
2 GRIT couples an "assurance" with an unconditional move as defined by the "response rule." (Nalebuff
and Dixit, 1991, 124-126) An assurance is simply a promise to perform some task, unconditionally. In
31
improvement, Osgood (1979) refined the GRIT strategy to improve its persuasive
content. He determined that negotiators should stipulate their specific cooperative
intentions and extend an invitation to reciprocate. The findings reported from
Lindskold, et al (1986) indicate that (1) specific announcements of intentions were
unnecessary, general announcements were sufficient, and (2) the announcement is
more effective when followed by an invitation to respond cooperatively. Variants
of the GRIT strategy allow for negotiators to grant forgiveness of their
counterpart's competitive play. This variant of GRIT provides the negotiator with
the flexibility to ignore some competitive signals and thus avoid reacting to
misinterpretation.
D. TRIANGLE MODEL
The Triangle Model (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970) (see Figure 11) suggests
that those negotiators having the competitive orientation will see their counterparts
as competitive (one point of the triangle) and will only choose to compete. This
model also supposes that cooperatives recognize, in their counterparts, both
competitiveness and cooperation (the other two points). According to the triangle
model, cooperatives will match the strategy that they read in their opponents.
They will act cooperatively with others whom they perceive as cooperative;
competitively with comperitives. Other researchers have provided ample evidence
to refute the premises of this short lived model. According to Lindskold, Walters,
and Koutsourais (1983), competitors may cooperate, but less than cooperators.
GRIT, the initial cooperative move is unconditional; it occurs regardless of circumstances. By providing
the assurance, then performing the unconditional move, the GRIT negotiator establishes credibility. The
response rule also incorporates conditional moves: threats or promises. A threat can be either deterrent
(promising to punish "wrong" behavior) or compellent (an ultimatum demanding "right" behavior). A
promise can be either deterrent (affirming reward for avoiding "wrong" behavior) or compellent
(affirming reward for "right" behavior). If the negotiator has established credibility in using the GRIT
strategy, then this history, which includes punishing wrong behavior, sets up a heavily veiled threat, i.e.,
"figure out that I expect you to repay my cooperation, or I will punish you." In Osgood's (1979) revised
GRIT, the act of assuring cooperation, and inviting the same more clearly spells out the demand for
































Figure 11. Triangle Model (Kelley and Tahelski, 1970)
Also, Williams refutes the outcome that the Triangle Model predicts for
competitor versus competitor. According to Williams, two effective competitors
will recognize their situation and become cooperative. From William's
perspective on the Triangle Model's theory, two questions remain. How do these
"cooperating" competitors negotiate? Do they use an interest-based approach, or
do they use a position-based, yet cooperative approach? The Triangle Model also
raises another important question: do position-based negotiators only see
negotiations as position-based, and interest-based negotiators see both position-
and interest-based? If the concepts in the Triangle model can be applied to cross-
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over theory, we might aid our counterparts in "crossing over" to interest-based
negotiation by explaining the interest-based tenets (or even by informing them that
interest-based negotiation exists). In fact, Lamm (1997) submits that a lack of
understanding of interest-based negotiation presents a substantial barrier to its use.
E. SPIRAL-REINFORCEMENT MODEL
Zand's (1971) Spiral-reinforcement Model outlines the relationship
between (1) the intentions one party has towards the other, (2) the expectations
one party has of the other, and (3) the degree of trust one party places in the other.
As the model in Figure 12 illustrates, one party (P) has certain predisposed
expectations of the other (O). Once P and O interact, P observes O's action, as
Boyd's cycle would affirm. In P's observation, he notes the degree to which O's
behaviors restrict the flow of information to P, resist influence from P, and seek to
impose control of P. Based on this observation, P makes some judgment about
O's tmstworthiness (P's Orientation in Boyd's Cycle) P draws some conclusion
that O's behavior confirms P's expectations and justifies P's degree of trust in O.
(P's Decision according to Boyd). P then formulates his intentions and
expectations regarding O's tmstworthiness and behaves accordingly, i.e., P's
behaviors may restrict information, resist influence, and seek to impose control to
some degree. (P's action/O 's observation) To the extent that these parties react to
some display of rnistworthiness (or lack of it), these behaviors, observations, etc.,
provide spiral reinforcement for continued trust or distrust. In the case of distrust,
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Figure 12. Model of the Interaction of Two Persons with Similar Intentions
and Expectations Regarding Trust (Zand, 1971)
Butler (1995, p. 487) concurred with Zand (1971) on two key points
suggesting that: sharing information and building trust combine synergistically,
and they are fundamentally the most important activities of a negotiation. Trust
and information sharing are certainly substantial factors in interest-based
negotiations. Furthermore, Butler's analysis (1995, p. 486) defined trust as a
willingness to put one's fate in the hands of another, i.e., a willingness to accept a
degree of influence from another. By illustrating the interrelationship of its three
key factors, the Zand model contributes substantially to our understanding of both
the shifting of negotiators' orientations and the factors which engender this shift.
Butler found that the principles behind spiral reinforcement were consistent with
the premises of Thomas' dual concern model. Specifically, the strong pursuit of
self-interests (high levels of assertiveness) do not forestall trust building or
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information sharing. The concept of spiral-reinforcement represents the antithesis
of the cross-over dynamic. In spiral-reinforcement, actions are seen as solidifying
a climate or organizational style of handling conflict. On the other hand, cross-
over dynamics are seen as reversing a climate. These two concepts share the same
underlying principles and are consistent with the "crude law of social relations."
(Deutsch, 1973)
F. THE "CRUDE LAW OF SOCIAL RELATIONS"
The three tenets of the crude law of social relationships work together to
show that (1) the negotiators' behaviors can establish the climate of a negotiation,
(2) the climate of a negotiation can determine the negotiators' behaviors, and (3)
deliberate behaviors can impel a shift in the climate of negotiations. The first two
of these three tenets suggests that certain conditions determine whether (1) the
group environment will determine individual behavior, or (2) whether behavior of
the individual creates the group environment. The third tenet parallels the concepts
first presented in Kurt Lewin's force field analysis theory. Force field analysis
theory promoted the belief that a social group's values arise from both its social
structure and the individual behavior of group members. Once established, both
structure and behavior are "frozen;" therefore, change is difficult. The individual
can bring about a change in group behavior by undertaking acts or shaping
processes which first "unfreeze" the existing orientation of group members, second
impel some change or "shifting", and third "refreeze" the new orientation. The
cross-over dynamic thus entails the first two actions: unfreezing and shifting.
Spiral-reinforcement involves the third, refreezing.
1. "The Atmosphere of a Relationship Will Foster Certain Acts and
Processes"
The first tenet of the crude law underscores the difficulty in changing
organizational culture or any other systems where well-established patterns of
interaction exist.
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A competitive atmosphere induces threat, coercion, deception,
suspicion, rigidity, faulty communication, and so forth. A
cooperative atmosphere, on the other hand, induces perceived
similarity, trust, open communication, flexibility, concern for the
other, emphasis on mutual interests, and attraction between parties.
(Lindskold, Betz, and Walters, 1986, p. 99)
Deutsch's first law is consistent with the premises of March and Simon's (1958)
theory on Organizational Reaction to Conflict, that an organization's systems,
culture, purpose, etc., greatly determine the way that parties work out agreements.
In the sense that negotiators come together and form their own organization, this
group influences the behavioral patterns. Reflective of systems thinking, this law
suggests that the organizational system as a whole determines which processes and
acts the players will follow, and consequently, which outcomes they can expect, in
other words, "structure influences behavior." (Senge, 1991, pp. 40-54)
The first tenet of the crude law logically explains a substantial challenge to
fostering interest-based negotiation. The organizational system is often the
predominant factor in detennining whether parties move away from position-based
activities, i.e., they adopt approaches such as problem-solving, low advocacy of
specific position, etc. In other words, given the extent to which an organization
prescribes roles which pit one party against the other, that organizational structure
has burdened the process through which the parties must operate to find shared
interests. However, since the factors which engender or spoil cooperation rely
heavily on the behavioral dynamics of human interaction, we should expect
cooperative behavior to promote a cooperative environment.
2. "The Processes and Acts Characteristic of a Given Type of Social
Atmosphere Will Induce That Very Atmosphere If Introduced
Into a Newly Forming Relationship"
In part, this tenet supposes that the acts in a new system have some degree
of power in defining the relationship of the actors. At the outset, this power in
defining their relationship gives them power to set up the social atmosphere which
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governs the subsequent processes and acts. Told another way, "...the first steps
set the wheels into motion to produce a whole series of related perceptions,
actions, and reactions." (Lindskold, Betz, and Walter, 1986, p. 100) Osgood's
GRIT approach embodies the theory behind the second tenet of Deutsch's law.
Specifically, the fact that GRIT leads one's counterpart down the path of
cooperation (even after a reprimand) rests on this second tenet of Deutsch's law.
In other words, one of the underlying principles of GRIT is that "the processes and
acts characteristic of a (cooperative) atmosphere will induce (cooperation) if
introduced into a newly forming relationship" (Deutsch, 1973) Again, where this
tenet is applied to cooperation and competition, the behavioral dynamics of human
interaction may predominate as factors shaping the climate of interaction.
As discussed in the first tenet of the crude law, having particular processes
is a more substantial requirement in building interest-based negotiation and less
substantial in cooperative negotiation. The second tenet suggests that negotiators
can change the atmosphere of a negotiation by implementing acts and processes.
Accordingly, when negotiators implement the processes which characterize a
certain atmosphere, they create that atmosphere (and foster the comparable
orientation).
3. "A Firmly Developed Atmosphere Will Be Readily Changed
Should One Party Act Deliberately and Clearly In a Manner
Contradictory to the Existing Atmosphere"
Furthering Deutsch's Law, Lindskold, Betz, and Walters (1986) proposed
the third tenet: that "Cooperation can be spoiled and conflict can be resolved if one
party acts deliberately (not accidentally) and clearly (not ambiguously) in a
manner incompatible with that sort of relation."3 (Lindskold, Betz, & Walters,
This notion that parties can "act deliberately and clearly" to either "spoil cooperation" or "resolve
conflict" is the fundamental premise behind the researcher's model. For instance, when competitors
follow the OODA loop, they respond to the other's behaviors. When these behaviors are seen as both
threatening our own competitive behaviors and rewarding our cooperative behaviors, they tend to change
the organizational climate towards PERSUADE and PROBSOLV, i.e., towards an integrative approach.
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1986) This "third law" suggests that the parts can influence the whole (or that by
applying sufficient force, the tail can wag the dog). As Lamm (1997) suggested:
In the negotiation I could try to portray or be a certain kind of
person, but it could very well be that (some condition) creates a high
pressure, high intensity. What's going to happen is that I would
probably revert without even realizing to a nature, a behavior that I
ordinarily would feel comfortable with....
In short, actors in an established negotiating relationship can follow fixed paths
much like a phonograph needle might follow its fixed groove. If on any run, some
force causes the needle to skip, then the needle fixes a new rut for itself, i.e., a rut
which will cause the needle to skip in each subsequent run.
G. FIVE CONFLICT-HANDLING MODES
Widely cited in conflict management literature, Thomas and Kilmann's
(1976) Five Conflict-handling Modes is one of the cornerstone models addressing
negotiator orientation as a factor of personal characteristics or intentions. From
Thomas's theory, Figure 13 illustrates the dynamics between certain endowments-
-assertiveness and cooperativeness—and the integrative and distributive
orientations. This class of dual concern models displaced the previously
predominant single concern models and their "either/or" paradigm, i.e., either
assertive or cooperative. Now a negotiator could be described as both assertive
and cooperative. In Thomas's model, parties held specific strategic intentions in
their approach to managing conflict. In competing, the party works assertively,
but not cooperatively. In collaborating, the party works both assertively and
cooperatively. Compromising represents the intermediate level of assertiveness
and cooperation; simply put, compromising represents give and take. In avoiding,
the party works neither assertively nor cooperatively. In accommodating, the party











Figure 13. The Five Conflict-Handling Modes (Thomas, 1976)
1. Conflict-handling Modes and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicators
In Figure 14, Thomas and Kilmann (1975) have recreated their model to
show correlations between certain dimensions of strategic intentions and
dimensions of Jungian character traits as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator.
4
Their 1975 study showed that "the Jungian functions related to judging
(thinking vs. feeling) and the type of enactment (introverted vs. extroverted) are
significantly related to an individual's conflict handling behavior." (Thomas &
Kilmann, 1975, p. 971) In the integrative dimension, our strategic intentions
move along a continuum from avoiding (low assertiveness/low cooperation) to
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is a forced-choice personality survey which seeks to measure four
Jungian dimension: Introversion vs. Extroversion, Sensing vs. Intuitive, Thinking vs. Feeling, and
Perceiving vs. Judging. Among the several other instruments which measure the same four dimensions,
the Keirsey-Bates version is widely used.
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collaborating (high assertiveness/high cooperation). Their study suggests that
extroverts tend to collaborate, and introverts tend to avoid. In the distributive
dimension, our strategic intentions move along a continuum from competing (high
assertiveness/low cooperation) to accommodating (low assertiveness/high
cooperation). Their study also suggested that thinking has a high correlation to














Figure 14. Conflict-handling behavior as a reflection of the Jungian
dimensions of Thinking-Feeling and Introversion-
Extroversion (Thomas & Kilmann, 1975)
In a small sample of 19 military officers in a Naval Postgraduate School program management course,
1 1 were ESTJs according to the Keirsey-Bates version of the Myers-Briggs type indicators. Each of these
11 officers also tested highest in high assertive behaviors: Collaborating, Competing and Compromising.
This small sample also manifested unusual patterns. For instance, the author's results, ENTJ, are
consistent with uncooperative approaches; however, his Thomas-Kilmann results were high assertive.
Perhaps certain professions or roles foster mock behaviors, e.g., the Thinking/Introvert military officer
will behave as a thinking/extrovert when carrying out that role.
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2. The Aggressive/Assertive Continuum
Aronson's (1984) social-psychological work, particularly his writings on
aggression, corroborates the conclusions offered by Thomas. The link between
aggression and assertiveness amplifies how certain cross-over dynamics might
unfold. Aggression as Aronson describes it, involves (1) hostile aggression, or
aggression for aggression's sake, and (2) instrumental aggression, aggression to
achieve some end. (Aronson, 1984) Hostile aggression is generally the result of
emotional reaction and is typically brought about by motives such as vengeance or
anger. Hostile aggression is not designed to accomplish some end; it is its own
end. Instrumental aggression is generally the result of the orchestrated use of force
or coercive power and is typically employed to satisfy the need for control through
punishment. Instrumental aggression need not be personal and can be indirect.
This is the case when one party subverts the others BATNA. For example, Tim
hopes to establish a monopoly and sell beans to Mary and Sue, but Sue declines.
Tim discovers that Sue is buying from Peter. If Tim makes some effort to buy
Peter out (or even burn Peter out) to achieve a monopoly, Tim has shown
instrumental aggression.
Thomas focuses on the degree of assertiveness as "the party's desire to
satisfy one's own concerns." (Thomas, 1976, p. 900) These propensities suggest
another continuum6 (see Figure 15) which illustrates a trade-off between a party's
willingness to either interfere with another or defend its own interests. In
6
Instead of this linear continuum, we might set these modes of force employment along a circular
continuum. At twelve o'clock, the most effective mode is assertiveness. Proceeding clockwise to two
o'clock, we find indirectness, which is characterized by manipulativeness and deceptiveness. (Patterson,
1996, p. 34) Still clockwise to four o'clock, we find passiveness, then passive aggression at six o'clock.
From the apex proceeding counter-clockwise to ten o'clock, we find instrumental aggression; still further
counter-clockwise to eight o'clock, we find hostile aggression; finally closing the circle at six o'clock with
passive aggression. This circular model might be useful in illustrating how the modes of force we employ
are less optimal as we move away from assertiveness—away from 12 o'clock and towards six o'clock;
however, the linear continuum more easily fits within the Thomas-Kilmann model to demonstrate excess
concern for one's own interest.
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considering negotiation effectiveness, the negotiating parties should strive to avoid
the extremes and operate at an optimum position along the continuum. In other
words, we expect effective negotiators to maintain a certain level of assertiveness







Figure 15. Aggressive/Assertiveness Continuum (proposed by the researcher)
Following this hypothesis that assertiveness can be shown along a
continuum of force which negotiators should use in the pursuit of their own goals,
other research supports the view that negotiators can apply an optimal level of
assertiveness. In a synthesis of Zand's mistrust model and Thomas' conflict
handling modes model, Butler (1995) suggested that by strongly pursuing one's
own interest, the negotiator would begin the downward spiral, i.e., the pursuit of
self-interest would lead to a lack of trust, withholding information, and seeking to
impose controls on others. However, Butler's (1995) findings supported a
different conclusion: "pursuit of self-interest did not hamper trust." Although,
Butler's research did not bear out his hypothesis, the findings presented seem to
reconcile the Zand and Thomas models. Specifically, this research suggests that in
collaboration, a negotiator can work both cooperatively and assertively (vigorously
pursuing his or her own self-interest) and not necessarily create the downward
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spiral of distrust. (Butler, 1995, p. 497) Again, the reasonable application of
assertiveness (force to ensure self-interest) does not hamper agreement, but when
others make aggressive attempts to impose their will, their aggression meets with
our resistance and begins the downward spiral of resisting influence, fomenting
mistrust, and supressing information.
H. PHASES OF NEGOTIATION PRESCRIBE NEGOTIATOR
ORIENTATION
Charles Craver (1995) suggests that negotiator orientation changes as the
parties enter different phases of negotiation. Craver suggests that negotiations
characteristically contain four phases: an information phase, a competitive/
distributive phase, a closing phase, and a cooperative/integrative phase. For
example, during the information phase, negotiators ask questions regarding the
circumstances, issues, etc. For Craver, this "fact-finding" phase, is
characteristically integrative. Negotiator orientation shifts as the parties enter the
competitive/ distributive phase, which is characteristically competitive as its name
suggests. In this phase, the parties articulate their specific demands. The
negotiation remains competitive as the parties enter the closing phase, which is a
critical, thus highly competitive phase in negotiations. Lastly, the negotiators
enter the cooperative/ integrative phase. During this final phase, the negotiators
work to enhance joint gains through mutual accords. Once again, their approach
becomes characteristically cooperative. Although his phase theory applies
primarily to formalized legal negotiations, we can find merit in its underlying
premise, that phases can influence negotiator orientation. Lamm (1997) suggests
three more broadly applicable phases: fact-finding, narrowing the difference
(problem-solving), and hard bargaining. Since fact-finding is characterized by the
act of information sharing (and likely the trust and acceptance of influence suggest
by Zand) this phase is the most conducive to interest-based negotiation. As the
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negotiation progresses, particularly towards the hard bargaining, we expect the
negotiators to review the discussion and revise their statements in an attempt to
bolster their positions. (Lamm, 1997) This may drive the parties towards the
position-based approach.
I. CROSS-OVER MECHANICS: ORGANIZATIONAL REACTION TO
CONFLICT DEPICTED AS A SINGLE CONCERN
Arising from the researcher's model (above in Figure 1), the central issue of
this study is the existence of the cross-over dynamic. This single concern model
places March and Simon's (1958) taxonomy along the Distributive/Integrative
continuum shown in Figure 16. This continuum shows that from left to right, the
organizational reaction to conflict changes from position-based to interest-based,
respectively. In this diagram, problem-solving is seen as a wholly integrative
activity. Persuading can be applied to a wide range of approaches from
integrative, to equitable, to maximalist positions. Bargaining and politicking
generally exist in position-based negotiation. Presented another way, problem-
solving is characteristically an interest-based process; persuade, characteristically
cooperative, i.e., persuade has its greatest utility in either interest-based or
cooperative position-based negotiation; politic and bargain are characteristically
position-based. As March and Simon (1958, p 129) explain "in the problem-
solving process the importance of assembling information is stressed, search
behavior is increased, and considerable emphasis is placed on evoking new
alternatives." Where negotiators come together and treat information as a
collectively owned resource, they have organized into a problem-solving group;
they have handled the problem in a wholly integrative manner. Outside of the
interest-based approach, problem-solving is risky and offers less utility, thus we
have placed it on the far right end of the position-based interest based continuum.




Figure 16. Model of Organizational Reaction to Conflict
(Adapted from March & Simon, 1958)
organization but that goals need not be taken as fixed." (March and Simon, 1958,
p. 129) In persuasion, information exchange is less important than in problem-
solving. Persuasion typically uses information to influence others to modify their
subgoals (or positions), or in the case of interest-based negotiations, persuasion
generally uses information to modify the underlying assumptions or principles that
negotiators may hold. Problem-solving and persuasion are the most useful
approaches in interest-based negotiation; however, the advocacy component of
persuade makes it also useful in position-based negotiation. Of the four styles,
persuade is the most versatile conflict handling approach, but it is most effective in
interest-based and cooperative position-based approaches. In cases where a
position-based negotiation is outside of the cooperative sphere, our counterparts
will be less open to persuasion, thus persuade looses its effectiveness. In the cases
where the negotiation is both position-based and not cooperative, negotiators use
bargaining and politicking. "Where bargaining is used, disagreement over goals is
taken as fixed, and agreement without persuasion is sought." (March and Simon,
1958, p. 130) In other words, in bargaining we might agree to disagree, but then
look for areas where compromise is possible so that we can satisfy some of our
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desires. Typically bargaining involves the tools of gamesmanship: some degree of
deception and power-wielding. (March and Simon, 1958, p. 130) As with
bargaining, negotiators engaged in politicking see the substantive issues of
negotiation as fixed according to their respective positions; however, in politicking
"the arena of bargaining is not taken as fixed by the participants." (March and
Simon, 1958, p. 130) In other words, the gamesmanship of politicking is carried
out through alliances which arise out of inter-group conflict; our side against
yours. Under politicking, parties seek to frame the conflict as more complex than
bilateral. March and Simon suggest that problem-solving and persuading are used
more to resolve individual conflict; bargaining and politicking, to resolve
intergroup conflict. Because an essential characteristic of politicking is its
reliance on intergroup conflict, it is more difficult to set aside positions and
examine underlying interests. For this reason, politicking is the least conducive to
interest-based negotiation and belongs on the left end of the continuum.
Through the proposed model (Figure 16 above), the researcher intends to
convey that behaviors and other factors shape the organizational reaction to
conflict which in turn promotes a certain negotiator orientation. In other words,
the same dynamics that contribute to spiral-reinforcement can work in reverse as
cross-over factors. Said yet another way, by behaving in a way that would
distinctly reinforce one particular orientation, a party can undo or even reverse a
situation characterized by the opposite negotiator orientation. By setting the
categories of organizational reaction to conflict along a continuum, we illustrate a
pathway similar to that suggested in the third aspect of the crude law of social
relations: "a firmly developed atmosphere will be readily changed should one
party act deliberately and clearly in a manner contradictory to the existing
atmosphere. Cooperation can be spoiled and conflict can be resolved if one party
7
March and Simon grouped problem-solving and persuading together as the analytic processes to resolve
conflict; bargaining and politicking are grouped as the bargaining processes.
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acts deliberately (not accidentally) and clearly (not ambiguously) in a manner
incompatible with that sort of relation" (Deutsch, et. al, 1986, p. 100)
March and Simon's theory on Organizational Reaction to Conflict offers
categories through which we can recognize "shades of gray" between interest-
based and position-based negotiation. In this way, we can see negotiator
orientation not as an either/or proposition, but as shifting gradually along an
interest-based/position-based continuum. While March and Simon's taxonomy
parallels this interest-based/position-based continuum, it helps us explain and
predict perceptible changes in reaction to conflict by drawing appreciable
distinctions between four conflict management styles.
J. SUMMARY
March and Simon's theory on the organizational reaction to conflict
suggests that people approach negotiations and conflict handling in a manner
characteristic of the organization's particular style, thus a change in the
organization can promote a cross-over to some desired orientation. Tit-for-Tat
was designed to promote a cross-over from a competitive orientation to a
cooperative orientation by (1) rewarding those behaviors consistent with the
desired cooperative orientation, and (2) punishing behaviors consistent with the
undesirable competitive (or even hostile) orientation. GRIT is based on the
premise that we can foster a cross-over (competitive to cooperative) by
communicating our cooperative intentions, acting cooperatively, punishing
uncooperative behavior, and reaffirming our preference to deal with mutual
cooperation. The Triangle Model suggests that our competitive counterparts may
be incapable of cross-over to cooperative negotiation because they see the world as
competitive. Accordingly, this model implies that the act of showing a
competitive counterpart that we are likely to cooperate (and how that cooperation
will work), is an essential first step. This theory may be even more valid in
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explaining interest-based negotiations to people holding a position-based
orientation. Spiral-reinforcement suggests that we can promote a cross-over to a
specific orientation by: (1) the degree to which we exhibit mutual trust and
tmstworthiness, (2) the degree to which we seek to impose controls on the other,
and (3) the degree to which we resist (or accept) influence. The third tenet of the
crude law of social relations states that a firmly developed atmosphere can be
reversed if we act deliberately and distinctly in a manner uncharacteristic of the
existing atmosphere. The cross-over factor theory goes further to suggest that
those behaviors and other factors characterizing the opposite orientation will cause
negotiators to shift orientations, i.e., from interest-based negotiation to position-
based negotiation or vice-versa.
Most of the theories and models presented above support the notion that
behavioral interaction shape the negotiator's orientation. For instance, spiral
reinforcement theory and the crude law of social relations provide mechanisms
which outline how behavioral interaction changes negotiator orientation. Tit-for-
Tat and GRIT go even further to prescribe behaviors to secure the desired
negotiator orientation in our counterpart(s). Thomas' model suggests that certain
personality traits or attitudes precede behavioral interaction and govern a party's
tendency toward a specific conflict-handling orientation. Thomas has, however,
discussed situational factors among the several variables recognized as affecting
orientation. For example, Thomas explains that in a particular scenario "the
collaborative orientation is partly a response to mutual identification." (Thomas,
1976, p. 900) As such, an orientation may be induced by factors not restricted to
traits or endowments alone—orientation may be affected by several variables
including situational factors. Accordingly, since the literature has identified
behavioral factors, process factors, and structural factors affecting orientation,
research should consider these factors or groupings of variables as potential cross-
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over factors. Several of the models presented in this chapter suggest that some sort
of cross-over dynamic exists. Furthermore, the creators of these models offered
empirical evidence to show that negotiators will change their orientation from
competitive to cooperative, and vice versa, given the presence of certain conditions
or factors. Taken primarily from three studies, the next chapter presents a set of
conditions considered among a host of potential cross-over factors.
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IV. FACTORS AFFECTING NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION
This chapter presents a collection of "cross-over factor candidates" drawn
primarily from three different studies and addressing three different research
concerns. As the factors are presented, the researcher offers limited analysis of the
underlying hypothesis to determine whether the factor has a positive or negative
effect on cooperative or integrative negotiation. Those factors showing negative
effects on cooperation or integrative negotiation can be considered as factors
promoting competition or distributive negotiation. For example, since research
suggests that high anxiety decreases cooperation, we presume it increases
competition. To simplify the analysis, the factors are presented as promoting
cooperation. It follows that the discussion will address how high levels of some
factors foster cooperation, e.g., high trust, while low levels of other factors have
the same effect, e.g., low anxiety. In the first study presented, Dant and Schul
(1992) outlined factors which are common to either (1) Probsolv and Persuade or
(2) Bargain and Politic. Concerning March and Simon's organizational reactions
to conflict, Dant and Schul offer insight into interest-based and position-based
negotiations, respectively. In the second study presented, Hermann and Kogan
(1977) examined eight personality characteristics or psychological factors. This
study considered how these factors promoted either competitive or cooperative
orientations in negotiators. In the third work presented, R. W. Johnston (1982)
presented a set of factors which he asserted would cause a shift from competition
to collaboration. Theories from several studies are presented at the end of this
section to offer single candidates for consideration on the list of cross-over factors.
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A. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CHOICE OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION METHODS
This subsection examines the framework through which Dant and Schul
(1992) presented a set of hypotheses to predict the organizational reaction to
conflict as outlined by March and Simon (1958). Comprised of a collection of
hypotheses derived from several different fields of study, this framework suggests
five major characteristic categories of the cross-over factors: issue, relationship,
environmental, structural and personality.
1. Issue Characteristics
Dant and Schul (1992, p. 41) reported that Probsolv and Persuade were
more prevalent than Bargain and Politic whenever issues involved high stakes or
high complexity. Citing Walton and McKersie (1965), they linked high incidents
of Probsolv and Persuade to issues involving high stakes (only in symmetrical
settings)
1
. The underlying hypothesis is that "greater stakes may tend to justify the
commitment of greater resources generally required in interest-based negotiation."
(Dant & Schul, 1992, p. 41, and Walton & McKersie, 1965)
Dant and Schul (1992, p. 42) maintained that Probsolv and Persuade also
accompanied negotiations where the issues involved high complexity (in
symmetrical settings). The basis for their assertion is that greater complexity
allows for a greater number of options and alternatives - the development of which
are essential in interest-based negotiation. (Kolb & Glidden, 1986) Their analysis
also considered opposing arguments. Complex issues take a degree of time and
"psychic energy" which might not be available for their resolution. (Clopton,
1984) Additionally, they suggested that complex issues are often solved through
abstractions (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975); in the abstract, the debate over issues often
leads to dogmatic stands based on principles. (Blake & Mouton, 1962; Walton &
McKersie, 1965) Their analysis is extensive but flawed in its citation of Pruitt
A symmetrical setting exists where the parties to a negotiation (or conflict) have relatively equal power
at the bargaining table. Asymmetrical settings exist where power resides with one or a few parties.
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and Lewis (1975, p. 628), who examined high cognitive complexity, and not high
issue complexity. This factor, cognitive complexity, represents a personality
characteristic and is discussed below in subsection C3
.
2. Relationship Characteristics
Probsolv and Persuade also predominated whenever the negotiating
relationship was characterized by high mutual control, high mutual trust, high
interaction and mutual responsiveness, and frequent contact. (Dant and Schul,
1992) Cited in Dant and Schul, Anderson and Narus (1990) asserted that
Probsolv and Persuade were more apparent in relationships involving a high
functionality of conflict. Functionality of conflict is the mutual control or power
that the negotiators hold to determine one anothers' future. "The more control that
one player has over the others' outcome, the more likely the parties are to seek an
integrative solution." (Anderson & Narus, 1990, pp. 62-74) Also cited, Stern and
Reve (1980) reported that whenever parties rely heavily on one another, they tend
to seek more integrative solutions since "[c]ooperation involves a combination of
object- and collaborator-centered activity which is based on a compatibility of
goals, aims, or values." (Stern & Reve, 1980, p. 57)
Anderson and Narus (1990) reported a high propensity for Probsolv and
Persuade whenever parties displayed a high degree of trust (in symmetrical
settings). The simple premise behind their assumption that "high trust promotes
high cooperation." (Anderson & Narus, 1990) is affirmed by Zand (1971): "High
trust promotes high information sharing, reduces the concern for placing controls
on the other party." Zand's Spiral Reinforcement model further underscores the
tenet that trust and cooperation are mutually supporting.
Probsolv and Persuade appear to be the primary approach whenever parties
interact with a high degree of relational ism From Kaufmann and Stern (1988),
the term relationalism denotes the level of interaction and responsiveness exhibited
between parties, i.e., the degree to which parties focus on their transactional
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exchanges, give and take. The hypothesis behind this assertion is that "the more
the exchange relationship, the relationship roles, and the mutual abilities of each
party to observe the other support a sense of fair play, the higher the cooperation."
(Kaufrnann& Stern, 1988, pp. 534-52) (Macneil, 1981) Independently, Johnston
(1982) further corroborated Dant and Schul's findings where he suggests that one
"increase the amount of time spent in fact-finding meetings." (Johnston, 1982, p.
163) Here Johnston's advise not only places the parties in proximity, it puts them
together in fact-finding, an activity that is central to interest-based negotiation.
Johnston (1982, p. 164) also suggested that negotiators can promote
collaboration by showing other members of the organization increased
attentiveness, which is comparable to responsiveness. Additionally, Johnston
(1982, p. 164) suggested that negotiators could foster collaboration through "[a]n
orientation toward goals and a willingness to implement suggestions."
Perreault and Miles (1978) contended that Probsolv and Persuade became
more dominant in organizations as the frequency of contact between parties
increased: "the frequency with which the focal person and target person engage in
work required contacts." (Perreault & Miles, 1978, pp. 23, 86-98) Stated more as
a prescription, Johnston (1982, p. 163) suggested that the negotiator "interact on a
more direct, face-to-face basis."
3. Environmental Characteristics
Probsolv and Persuade were evident whenever environmental factors
imposed a high degree of uncertainty or fostered a high degree of munificence.
(Dant and Schul, 1992) Research has not clearly established what affect a high
degree of uncertainty has on negotiator orientation. Achrol, Reve and Stern
(1983, p. 64) suggested that under high uncertainty participants are more
cooperative. However, Achrol et al, also hypothesized that high uncertainty leads
to greater conflict, which typically fosters competition. Furthermore, Lindskold,
Walters, and Koutsourais (1983, pp. 521-532) raised a question to the contrary:
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"Investigators should continue to explore the degree to which competitors act
competitively because of uncertain information." Dwyer and Oh (1987, pp. 347-
58) contended that Probsolv and Persuade were evident whenever the parties
interacted with a high degree of munificence. In other words, when parties
behave with generosity, they are more likely to pursue an integrative solution.
4. Structural Characteristics
Probsolv and Persuade were broadly exhibited whenever the negotiating
structure of the organization was characterized by a high level of integration (or
by diminished support for some position-based reward structure as other evidence
suggests). Dant and Schul (1992, p. 41) contended that Probsolv and Persuade
were evident whenever negotiators worked within a structure that reflected high
organizational integration2 (in symmetrical settings). While Stern and Reve's
(1980 ) research addressed integrative benefits of certain formal channels and
configurations (such as vertical integration), the concept of high organizational
integration has broader implications for connecting through informal channels. In
addition to Dant and Schul' s findings above, a diminished position-based reward
structure may foster interest-based negotiation. Johnston (1982, p. 163)
suggested that "Rules of the Game" that do not incentivize conflict and that do not
fail to punish aggression foster collaborative negotiation.
5. Personality Characteristics
Probsolv and Persuade were preferred whenever personality characteristics
reflected high self-esteem and high similarity between negotiators. (Dant and
Schul, 1992) Dant and Schul' s findings on self-esteem are presented below in
section C, the Eight Personality Characteristics. (Hermann & Kogan, 1977)
Researchers have reported a greater likelihood of Probsolv and Persuade in
cases where negotiators shared common personal circumstances. This high
2
These findings specifically addressed the marketing channels of supplier to producer to distributor.
Where these marketing channels were vertically integrated, the various parties were more likely to work
out their differences through integrative means.
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similarity of social class, education, race, common experiences engenders mutual
cooperation. 'Greater similarity between buyers and sellers is related positively to
more problem-solving-oriented strategies used by buyers (and)... sellers."
(Campbell, et. al) 1988, p. 52) Framed another way, high similarity may tend to
reduce suspiciousness , one of the eight personality characteristics named below.
B. SHIFTING FROM COMPETITION TO COLLABORATION
In Lewicki (1985), Johnston's reprinted article Negotiation Strategies:
Different Strokes for Different Folks specifically addressed the factors which
provide an opportunity to shift the negotiations towards the collaborative, or
interest-based. Although, the Johnston (1982) article does not cite or report the
empirical results of experiments or studies, its value for this researcher arises from
its direct concern for the interest-based orientation. Dant and Schul (1992)
provided empirical evidence to suggest that the factors identified were
predominant during problem-solving and persuasion, which represent the more
integrative approaches. Johnston suggests that negotiators should actively seek to
cross-over from the competitive to the collaborative (interest-based) orientation
once they note the conditions listed below in Figure 17.
Better coordination of efforts
Better division of labor and equitable distribution of work.
Internal or external motivation from individuals to achieve goals
Increased amount of communication, particularly active listening to achieve
understanding
Mutual comprehension and common appraisals of communications
Increased attentiveness to other members of the organization
An orientation toward goals and a willingness to implement suggestions
Increased productivity per unit of time
Higher quality of product and more informed discussion about the job
Friendliness during discussions
Figure 17. Shifting From Competition to Collaboration
(Johnston, 1982)
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The factors suggested in Figure 17 are presented in the next five subsections using
Dant and Schul's (1992) framework.
1. Issue Characteristics
Mutual comprehension and common appraisals of communications decrease
the opportunity for discrepant "thought processes, perceptions, or judgments"
between negotiators. (Rahim, 1992 ) This discrepancy in understanding is referred
to as cognitive conflict. "In its extreme form, two parties' inferences from the
same data are logical contradictions of one another" (Cosier & Rose, 1977, p. 379)
An orientation toward goals and a willingness to implement suggestions provides
an atmosphere which supports discussion and dialogue on how to achieve goals
instead of objectives. The willingness to implement suggestions further
encourages the feedback and dialogue essential to integrative processes. When
negotiators show a willingness to implement suggestions, they are being
cooperative in the strict sense; coupled with the goal orientation, they bring about
mutual problem-solving through cooperation and communication. The issues of
higher quality of product and more informed discussion about the job represent
goals and concerns which rely on effective coordination. In a practical sense, the
quality movement has changed industry's traditional relationships so that
suppliers, manufacturers, and distributors customarily abandon their past
adversarial roles in favor of partnering arrangements. The quality movement has
also led internally to more informed discussion about the job. A requirement of
employee empowerment is the participation in integrative processes such as job
design, process mapping, and product improvement. (Walton, 1986, pp. 121-238)
2. Relationship Characteristics
Increased attentiveness to other member(s) of the organization brings about
a high degree of trust, a high degree of contact, and promotes active listening.
Applied to negotiations, participants giving increased attentiveness to their
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counterparts may promote the shift towards cooperative and ultimately interest-
based negotiation. The mere act of giving increased attentiveness commits the
involved parties to the concerns of others. As one of six principles of the
unconditionally constructive strategy for interest-based negotiation, Fisher (1988,
pp. 38, 64-83) prescribes understanding. "Even if they misunderstand us, try to
understand them." (Fisher, 1988, p. 38)
3. Environmental Characteristics
The internal or external motivation from individuals to achieve goals can
provide a powerful cross-over incentive depending on the source of motivation.
Typically, negotiators feel pressure from a client who does not consider the best
deal to be merely having his or her interests met. This client is satisfied by
achieving victory over his or her counterpart. The external motivation or pressure
provided by the client can thus drive negotiators towards the position-based
approach. "However, depending on the source of constituent pressure (external
motivation) you may see strong pressure on both sides from the same source, i.e.,
Congress, which drives negotiators towards the interest-based." (Wilkoff, 1997)
An increased amount of communication, particularly active listening to achieve
understanding provides an essential component to problems-solving and
integrative approaches. As mentioned above in the discussion on increased
attentiveness, improved interaction brings about a high degree of trust, a high
degree of contact, and promotes active listening. Where Johnston prescribes
increased attentiveness as a personal act, increased communication is a result of
organizational change. Negotiators who want to apply this principle will create
and use organizational structures and systems which facilitate interaction. For
example, by isolating themselves at Camp David, statespersons set aside their
other activities and increase their communication with one another. They also
remove the distractions of media and other third parties. Once removed from
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public view, they have less motivation to engage in grand standing; they are less
concerned with rhetoric and more concerned with understanding. Johnston's
suggestion that friendliness during discussions is a collaborative force is supported
by the findings reported above in high munificence studies. (Dwyer and Oh, 1987,
pp. 347-58) Again, integrative behavior often incorporates conflict resolution and
tension reduction.
4. Structural Characteristics
Better coordination of efforts , better division of labor, and equitable
distribution of work each involve the effective use of resources. When the
coordination and work effort processes are effective, the organization is more
likely to achieve the results which its members expected from teamwork. Thus
when negotiators team effectively, i.e., they have effective coordination or efforts,
division of labor, and equitable distribution of work and responsibilities, they have
a much greater capacity for problem-solving. "(Their) search behavior is devoted
to finding mutually satisfying solutions to problems; utilizing logical, creative and
innovative processes; and developing constructive relationships with each other."
(Johnston, 1982, p. 159) Also when resource allocation presents inefficiency,
ineffectiveness, or inequity, the parties involved perceive that the cost of working
together is relatively high; accordingly, they will tend to adopt a scarcity
mentality. The most fleeting resource negotiators typically face is time. Johnston
suggests that the increased productivity per unit of time will foster collaboration,
in other words, the effective use of time helps people work together. Studies in
time pressure do not substantially elucidate Johnston's supposition that the
effective use of time or the increased benefit of time fosters collaboration.
Carnevale and Lawler (1987) report that:
3
While the researcher presents the economic paradigm, high cost-benefit ratios foster the scarcity
mentality, Covey (1991, pp. 61-62) suggests that "(m)ost people are deeply scripted in the scarcity
mentality. They see life as a finite pie..." He suggests that character sets up this abundance mentality.
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When negotiators adopted a cooperative orientation, they achieved
high outcomes regardless of time pressure. In combination with an
individualistic orientation, time pressure produced greater
competitiveness, firm negotiator aspirations, and reduced
information exchange. In combination with a cooperative
orientation, time pressure produced greater cooperativeness and
lower negotiator aspirations. (Carnevale and Lawler, 1987, p. 636,
also Wilkoff, 1997)
Against the background of the Carnevale and Lawler study, Johnston's supposition
raises questions about the negotiators' orientation and their ability to respond to
time pressure. Specifically, do cooperative (collaborative) negotiators choose to
make better use of their time when under pressure? Will they develop "lower
negotiator aspirations" as Carnevale and Lawler stated above? If so, then time
pressure appears to be a force for compromise, even accommodation, but not
necessarily collaboration. This conclusion would only suggest that if negotiators
can derive greater utility from their time, i.e., increased productivity per unit of
time, then cooperatives might be better able to assert their own self-interests. The
studies here do not support that conclusion; moreover, we have uncovered no
evidence that increased productivity of time will foster a shift from competition to
collaboration.
5. Personality Characteristics
Of the several factors presented above, none addresses personality
characteristics. As factors, personality characteristics tend to be fixed, that is, they
do not tend to be attributes that one could introduce into a negotiation to engender
a shift in negotiator orientation. In the following section, we have examined the
eight personality characteristics presented in Hermann and Kogan's (1977)
research.
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C. EIGHT PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS
In their chapter, Effects of Negotiators ' Personalities on Negotiating
Behavior, Hermann and Kogan presented eight well-studied variables in a useful
framework. "These eight characteristics were chosen because each has been used
in more than one experimental study concerned with these traits that have
examined orientation, process variables, or dyads." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p.
249) For each of the following eight characteristics, Hermann and Kogan wrote
their hypothesis that the more (or less) of some characteristic a negotiator has, "the
more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more
cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." The authors stress the distinction
between negotiating behavior and orientation.. Negotiating orientation refers to
negotiators' intentions before interacting in actual negotiations. Hermann and
Kogan (1977) examined the eight personality traits against three negotiator
orientations. They described the competitive orientation as competing and
expecting the other to compete. Cooperatives cooperate and expect cooperation.
Exploitatives compete and expect cooperation. None of the subjects in their
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) study cooperated when they expected competition. The
three orientations the authors observed were essentially position-based
orientations. Some of the authors' judgments about cooperative negotiation might
not support conclusions about interest-based negotiation; however, these factors
should be considered as candidates.
Some of the traits are more permanently fixed than others. Although a
negotiator cannot introduce these fixed traits, we have examined them as possible,
but not necessarily probable, cross-over factors showing latent effects. Other traits
may be more transitory, in other words, they may reflect the attitudes of the
present situation. They may also be role dependent. For instance, while it is
generally a reflection of intellect and abstract thinking ability, a negotiator's
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cognitive complexity depends on the subject matter, and thus it is situational. The
negotiator's levels of anxiety, risk-avoidance, and suspiciousness also arise from
the milieu of character traits and situational factors.
1. Low Anxiety
Hermann and Kogan (1977) specifically discussed high anxiety as a
competitive cross-over factor; consequently, the researcher has proposed that the
less anxious a negotiator is, the more cooperative (less competitive) is the
negotiator's behavior. Citing Baxter (1973) and Tedeschi Burrill, and Gahagan
(1969), Hermann and Kogan suggested that high anxiety leads to high caution and
a conservative approach. The authors added that the cautious typically select the
minimax approach and adopt a competitive strategy. (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p.
253) Their research findings, however, did not support their hypothesis. Hermann
and Kogan (1977, p. 262) found that the "[h]ighest anxiety scores were found for
subjects with a cooperative orientation; lowest anxiety scores were obtained for
those with an exploitative orientation [those who plan to compete with others
whom they expect to cooperate]."
2. Low Authoritarianism
Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 253) proposed the following: "The less
authoritarian a negotiator is, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a
negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior."
Citing Ashmore (1969), Berkowitz (1968), Deutsch (1960), Wrightsman (1966),
and Kelley and Stahelski (1970) in support of their hypothesis, the authors offered
their underlying premise "that low authoritarians have an egalitarian orientation to
the world...high authoritarians, according to Kelley and Stahelski, have an egoistic
orientation." They conclude that low authoritarians hold an egalitarian orientation
which supports a world view that all people are equally deserving, thus they work
cooperatively with others. Accordingly, they conclude that high egalitarians
harbor an egoism which supports a world view that self-interest resolves these
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issues, thus they work competitively with others. The authors add one caveat:
after initially having been exploited by high authoritarians, low authoritarians
"may overreact and match or better the competitiveness of the high authoritarian."
(Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 253)
3. High Cognitive Complexity
Citing research by Phelan and Richardson (1969), Harvey, et al. (1961),
and Driver (1976), Hermann and Kogan hypothesized that cognitive complexity
allowed negotiators to conceive outcomes other than the zero sum pay-off. In their
research, subjects with low cognitive complexity typically endeavored to reduce
their opponent's payoffs. Accordingly, the authors concluded that "the more
cognitively complex a negotiator is, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a
negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior."
(Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 254) Hermann and Kogan' s (1977, p. 262)
research, however, suggested that exploitatives are the most cognitively complex,
cooperators, moderate, and competitors, the least. On the other hand, Pruitt and
Lewis (1975, pp. 621-33) reported that people exhibiting high cognitive
complexity were more likely to pursue integrative solutions.
A personality variable, cognitive complexity(*), was employed in
this study. According to Schroeder. Driver, and Streufert (1967),
more complex individuals entertain more alternative conceptions of a
situation and gather and integrate more information when they have
to make a decision. Reasoning from the tliinking underlying the
third postulate presented above, we hypothesized that more complex
bargainers would achieve more integrative solutions, because they
would gather more information about one another's utility structures
and achieve more insights into how to integrate these utility
structures, (p. 628)
4
4 The asterisks (*) indicate where footnotes appeared in Pruitt & Lewis's original text. These footnotes
work together to clarify that their variable, "conceptual complexity," is an "integrative capacity" for the
negotiator. Conceptual complexity is "not related to IQ or academic achievement, it represents the ability
to think abstractly. The third postulate mentioned in the quote is as follows: "A problem-solving
orientation over-comes the difficulty in reaching agreement produced by higher limits."
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It follows that a negotiator endowed with cognitive complexity would more
handily follow the integrative steps of Fisher's Four step model. (Figure 7 above)
To derive the creative solutions which interest-based negotiation typically
demands, Fisher's method requires the problem-solver to analyze the situation by
considering what is wrong in theory and what might be done in theory.
4. High Tendency Towards Conciliation
Hermann and Kogan (1977) suggest that the greater a negotiator's tendency
toward conciliation as opposed to belligerence in interpersonal relations, the more
cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more
cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior. Their research supports this belief.
Citing research on belligerence and negotiator orientation, Ashmore, 1969;
Wrightsman, 1966; Shure and Meeker, 1965:11; Shure, et al., 1966; the authors
conclude that the opposite characteristic, conciliation, fosters cooperation.
However, Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 254) did not offer empirical evidence to
support this hypothesis. Furthermore, they add the caveat that conciliatory and
belligerent subjects provide a volatile mix; a conciliator may tend to overreact to
the competitiveness of a belligerent negotiator. (Shure et al, 1966)
5. High Dogmatism
Citing Vacchiano, et al (1968), Hermann and Kogan argued that dogmatic
negotiators tended to be more cooperative, but their rationale is both vague and
indeterminate at best. According to the authors, the dogmatic person needed to
have goals set by authority figures.
If the goal of the negotiation task, as explained by an authority figure
(e.g., an experimenter, a reference group), is to earn as much money
as possible, as is often the case in the PD, that goal can be integrated
with the need for positive feedback by cooperation, particularly if
one's opponent has tended to be cooperative.... Given the general
inflexibility and resistance to change of the more dogmatic
individual (see Vacchiano et al., 1969), once such subjects have
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selected a cooperative strategy, they can be expected to pursue it
tenaciously. (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p.255)
From this logic, the authors surmised that "the more dogmatic a negotiator is, the
more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation and the more
cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977, p. 255)
6. High Risk-Avoidance
Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 255) hypothesized that "[t]he greater a
negotiator's desire to avoid taking risks, the more cooperative is his/her orientation
to a negotiating situation and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating
behavior." (Shure and Meeker, 1965: 12), (Crowne, 1966), (Miller and Swanson,
1960) This hypothesis seems to contradict the authors' assertion above in 2a, that
since the anxious are more inclined to be "cautious and conservative [risk-adverse]
in an interpersonal situation, [t]hey expect the worst and try to minimize their
losses by adopting a competitive strategy." (Hermann & Kogan, 1977 p. 253) In
Hermann and Kogan's (1977, p. 255) study, they concluded that the high risk-
avoiding personality trait led to greater incidents of cooperative behavior and a
cooperative orientation.
Five of the eight studies in Table 8.1 indicate a significant positive
relationship between risk-avoidance and cooperation. Individuals
who are risk-avoiders are described by Shure and Meeker (1965:12)
as "unadventuresome" and "unwilling to expose themselves to
dangers or hazard risks of either a material or physical character."
Crowne (1966) suggests that such individuals are more interested in
reaching bargaining agreements than in using a competitive strategy,
and bargaining agreements are more likely to occur if cooperative
goals prevail over competitive ones. Miller and Swanson (1960)
indicate that the parents of risk-avoidant persons emphasize the
importance of being accepted and of finding and maintaining a niche
for oneself in the interlocking roles that exist in present complex
social organizations.
5
This citation makes reference to Hermann and Kogan's Table 8. 1 which is not shown.
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In other words, we should expect those with the high risk-avoidance characteristic
to "play by the rules." These findings seem to be counterintuitive, perhaps
erroneous. Simply put, we expect the high risk-avoidance persons to play it safe
and maximize their payoffs by using their dominant strategy, which in the
Hermann and Kogan study was the competing strategy.
6
As Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 266) noted, regardless of whether the
subjects' risk preference was high or low, their cooperative behavior increased,
thus for risk-avoidance, neither preference, high nor low, is expected to foster the
cross-over from cooperation to competition. Moreover, since cooperation
increased for both low and high risk preferences, we might also suspect that some
other variable, such as trust, had a greater effect on the dynamics of the
negotiation. Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 261) also noted the mean scores for
the risk avoidance personality variable showed no significant relationship to the
subjects' initial orientation, cooperative or competitive. Both the mixed results
from various researchers and the illustrations taken from the simulation support the
conclusion that neither the high nor the low risk-avoidance traits engenders a
specific initial orientation or negotiating behavior. Accordingly, we might
conclude that risk-avoidance is not a cross-over factor.
7. High Self-Esteem
Researchers disagree on whether high self-esteem promotes cooperation or
competition. Raven and Kruglanski's (1970, pp. 69-107) research indicated that
people high in self-esteem are more likely to use PERSUADE/PROBSOLV than
6
Since risk-avoidance is an economic behavior that can be expressed both algebraically and graphically,
we can test Hermann and Kogan's conclusions using a spreadsheet model to produce the various utilities
for each expected outcome given some particular risk preference.
Using the utility function, U=axb
,
the model was constructed to determine the utility of either competing
or cooperating, given the same payoffs used in Hermann and Kogan's prisoner's dilemma problem. For a
< 1, the relative utility of competing was higher as b increased; for a > 1, the relative utility of
cooperating was higher as b increased.
66
BARGAIN/POLITIC behavior. Maslow's theory would suggest that a self-
actualizing person would be high in self-esteem, and predisposed to use problem-
solving. Cited in Hermann and Kogan (1977), Pepitone (1964) suggested that
people who are high in self-esteem have confidence, expect success, and are more
likely to take advantage of situations offering them greater reward, thus they are
more competitive. Hermann and Kogan also cited Faucheux and Moscovici's
(1968) findings that high self-esteem supported a feeling of entitlement. The
authors' research findings concluded that competitives are highest in self-esteem,
exploitatives, moderate, and cooperatives, lowest.
8. Low Suspiciousness
Hermann and Kogan (1977, p. 256) proposed that "the less suspicious a
negotiator is, the more cooperative is his/her orientation to a negotiating situation
and the more cooperative is his/her negotiating behavior." Citing Shure and
Meeker (1965), the authors indicated that suspiciousness creates distrustful and
selfish behavior. They also suggested that the suspicious negotiator is likely to
work to adopt a kill or be killed approach. (Scott and Lyman, 1968) They further
supposed that in a mixed dyad, the trusting member could, over time, induce the
suspicious member to make integrative choices. The authors concluded by
proposing that a dyad of two highly suspicious negotiators would be most likely to
compete.
Hermman and Kogan (1977, p. 267) acknowledged that the work of
tackling personality factors was more complicated than they expected. Both their
review of the literature and their experiments consistently support their hypotheses
that high conciliation, low suspiciousness , low dogmatism , and low
authoritarianism support cooperation. By applying economic principles, we can
show mathematically how the preference for cooperation or competition depends
on the individual's utility function, thus low or high risk avoiders can prefer either
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cooperation or competition. Still unresolved are the questions concerning how
cooperation is affected by the other factors: anxiety, self-esteem, and cognitive
complexity.
D. OTHER POSSIBLE CROSS-OVER FACTORS
The previous three sections presented frameworks for examining factors
affecting negotiator orientation and behavior. This section presents a collection of
four key findings. High refraining, high security of relative standing, and high
extroversion foster an integrative orientation and integrative behaviors, while the
highly collaborative strategic intentions tend to support the parties' enacting
integrative behaviors.
1. Refraining
William Ury, author of Getting Past No, has suggested an integrative tactic
called reframing; specifically, "redirecting the other side's attention away from
positions and toward the task of identifying interests, inventing creative options,
and discussing fair standards for selecting an option." (1991, p. 78) The more that
reframing was evident during dialogue or discussion (Ury, 1991), and "[t]he more
that parties define the problem as though no real conflict exists, the more likely
they are to seek an integrative solution." (Johnston, 1982, p. 163) Under Dant and
Schul's (1992) framework, the act of reframing belongs partly to issue and partly
relationship characteristics. In other words, both the character of the relationship
and the character of the issue determine how frequently the parties will engage in
reframing.
2. Security of Relative Standing
In addition to the structural characteristics outlined by Dant and Schul
(1992), Lindskold et al. have suggested that whenever competitive parties perceive
little risk of losing their relative standing, they are more likely to cooperate.
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"Competitors are interested in their absolute as well as relative standing in a
relationship and that, when they can safely do so, they will join in mutually
beneficial cooperation." (Lindskold, et al., 1983, p. 530) In other words, the
parties are more likely to cooperate if they expect the outcome of their deal to
maintain or improve their rank or position (in money, percent ownership, etc.).
Accordingly, this concept of security of relative standing suggests that by reducing
parties' risk of loosing their relative standing, negotiators can promote greater
cooperation. The concept also suggests that high risk aversives will compete; low
risk averse will cooperate.
3. High Extroversion
Extroverts are energized by talking and working with people. (Keirsey &
Bates, 1984, p. 14) As discussed in Chapter III, subsection G.I., strong extrovert
personalities showed a high correlation with the collaborative orientation. "The
strongest and most consistent correlations for this dimension [introversion-
extroversion] are with the integrative dimension of conflict behavior, indicating
that individuals higher on extroversion are more likely to strive for integrative
solutions...there is also a tendency for extroversion to be related to assertiveness
on all three instruments"
8 (Kilmann & Thomas, 1975, pp. 977.) Extroversion fits
well within the framework of Dant and Schul's personality characteristics.
4. Collaborative Strategic Intentions
As discussed in Chapter HI, subsection G, strategic intentions represent an
initial predisposition or negotiator orientation. For example, negotiators who are
collaborative (both highly assertive and highly cooperative) are inclined to focus
on both parties' needs or interests and pursue an integrative solution. (Thomas,
1976) As such the collaborative strategic intention may indicate a latent factor
8 The three instruments mentioned in the citation are Thomas and Kilmann' s MODE instrument, the
Lawrence-Lorsch instrument, and the Hall instrument.
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which might be activated to bring about a cross-over from position-based to
interest-based negotiation. On the other hand, a competitive strategic intention
may prove to be more obstacle than cross-over factor for the negotiator who
desires an integrative process. Continuing along this vein, suppose a negotiator
succeeds in causing the shift towards interest-based. Let us also suppose that his
or her counter-part has the competitive strategic intention. We should expect this
competitiveness to serve as a latent factor which can undo the shift to interest-
based negotiation with a second cross-over. While strategic intentions are
primarily personality factors, they do not fit wholly within Dant and Schul's
framework. Strategic intentions are shaped by the collective force which the issue,
relationship, personality, environmental, and structural characteristics.
E. THE CROSS-OVER FACTORS
From the studies presented above, Figure 18 presents a list of potential
cross-over factors. This list organizes these factors in the frame work provided in






High mutual comprehension and commonality of appraisals of
communication
- RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISTICS
High functionality of conflict
High degree of trust
High refraining
High degree of relationalism




High degree of activelistening
High internal and external motivation to achieve goals
- STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
High organization integration
• High coordination of efforts/equitable division of work
Diminished position-based reward structure









High similarity with other
Low suspiciousness
Collaborative Strategic Intentions




V. THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT AS ANTECEDENT TO
INTEREST-BASED CROSS-OVER FACTORS
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters, we have discussed the nature of transactions for
both integrative and distributive orientations; we have discussed the dynamics
behind the shifting between orientations; we have discussed the factors involved—
the so-called "cross-over" factors. This chapter aims to help the reader consider
how conflict emerges in the antecedent phases as outlined in the Sawyer-
Guetzkow Model (Figure 2) in order to determine how the cross-over factors
operate. For negotiators to apply or exploit a cross-over factor, they must
recognize the source of conflict, then choose whether to resolve it distributively or
integratively. In a general sense, some sort of conflict precedes all negotiation
matters; accordingly, the intent of this chapter is to present a brief overview of the
sources of conflict. Of these two orientations or approaches to resolve conflict,
the distributive approach can be seen as a process for achieving victory—or at least
maximizing payoff—from either an all-or-nothing or zero-sum prospective. The
integrative approach can be seen as a process for removing conflict; thus for the
shift from positions to interests, some factor or factors can be seen as resolving the
sources of conflict.
The sources of conflict can be used as a framework in which to examine the
antecedents to the cross-over factors. If the integrative approach can be seen as a
process for removing conflict, then the cross-over factor is some activity or
condition which removes or alleviates conflict. The antecedent to the position- to
interest-based cross-over factor is the emergence of conflict. Conversely, if the
distributive approach can be seen as a process for maximizing payoff according to
a zero-sum perspective, then the cross-over factor is some condition which fixes
differences. The antecedent to the interest- to position-based cross-over is the
emergence of some incentive to take control in the process of detennining one's
73
portion of a gain. These are the antecedents in a general sense. The intent here is
not to present the antecedents to the cross-over factors previously listed since these
factors may come in and out of vogue. From a broader perspective, the concept of
antecedent conditions is brought out in the sources of conflict and their various
contests over resources, values, goals, meaning, etc.
B. SOURCES OF CONFLICT
Afzalur Rahim (1992) developed this classification of the sources of
conflict from the literature of organizational behavior and management. Much of
the effort in the integrative process goes towards de-conflicting; thus these sources
of conflict offer insight and perhaps help explain the conditions preceding the
cross-over from competition to cooperation, even position-based to interest-based.
The classification of conflict is often made on the basis of the
antecedent conditions that lead to conflict. Conflict may originate
from a number of sources, such as tasks, values, goals, and so on. It
has been found appropriate to classify conflict on the basis of these
sources for proper understanding of its nature and implications.
(Rahim, 1992, p. 19)
The items presented in these subsections are classifications and definitions
and were drawn from Rahim's (1992, pp. 19-21) brief description of the sources of
conflict. Of the items presented below, the reader might consider the first two
categories as broad classes of conflict rather than sources of conflict; however,
knowledge of these two antecedent cases still benefit negotiators in their efforts to
use cross-over factors. The next nine actually categorize conflict according to its
source—values or meaning, goals, issues, and emotion.
1. Institutionalized vs. Noninstitutionalized Conflict
Institutionalized conflict is described by the friction which arises when
formally prescribed roles pit a set of parties against one another. For example,
management and union representatives reflect institutionalized conflict in their
mutual suspicion of one another regardless of personal qualities.
'[Institutionalized conflict] is characterized by a situation in which actors follow
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explicit rules, they display predictable behavior, and their relationship has
continuity." (Rahim, 1992, 21) Noninstitutional conflict is typically represented in
racial conflict, ethnic conflict, and other situations where societal norms, not
formally prescribed roles, pit persons against one another.
2. Realistic vs. Nonrealistic Conflict
Any conflict can be viewed as either realistic or nonrealistic. As defined by
Rahim (1992, p. 21):
[Realistic conflict] refers to incompatibilities that have rational
content, that is, tasks, goals, values, and means and ends.
Nonrealistic conflict occurs as a result of a party's need for releasing
tension, and expressing hostility, ignorance, or error. Whereas
realistic conflict is associated with 'mostly rational or goal-oriented'
disagreement, nonrealistic conflict 'is an end in itself having little to
do with group or organizational goals' (Ross & Ross, 1989, p. 139.)
Realistic and nonrealistic conflict more aptly denotes types of conflict than actual
sources. We better understand whether the cross-over factor should be capable of
dealing with real goals, tasks, and principles, once we know the extent to which
the dispute represents some realistic conflict; we better understand whether the
cross-over factor should be capable of dealing with tensions, confusion, or falsity
by knowing the extent to which some nonrealistic conflict exists. For the next
nine items, their underlying concern for values, goals, tensions, hostilities, means,
ends, ignorance, and error coupled with their realistic and nonrealistic dimension
represent some unique dispute situation.
3. Affective Conflict
Also termed psychological conflict, affective conflict results when parties in
the act of negotiation discover that they have different feelings and emotions about
the issues. For example, John and Sarah agree that teen-age pregnancy is a
problem; John favors educational programs for teen-aged girls, while Sarah favors
tough laws providing for little public assistance and requiring fathers to pay child
support. As they debate their proposed solutions to the problem, they discover that
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they feel differently about the issue. John believes that teen-aged girls get
pregnant because they lack self-esteem and are not fully aware of the birth control
available. Sarah believes that teen-aged girls get pregnant because they and their
boy friends lack personal responsibility. In short, John and Sarah both agree that
teen pregnancy is a problem; however, they feel differently about that very issue.
Values are generally the underlying factor in affective conflict. As we see in this
example, parties involved in affective conflict can agree on the issues, but their
differentfeelings about the issues can lead them to desire different outcomes.
4. Conflict of Values
Conflicts of values occur when parties are confronted with ideological
differences. Also referred to as ideological conflict, an example of the conflict of
values is the debate over the abortion issue. As the name implies, values are
generally the underlying factor in the conflict of values. Conflicts of this nature
present a substantial obstacle to overcome. Lewin's (1951) three step model offers
an effective cross-over mechanism: unfreeze, change, then re-freeze. "Conflicts
on political issues are more difficult to resolve through negotiations when
positions are derived from broader values or ideologies. By separating values
from interest, conflicts are easier to resolve, although the impact of such
resolutions on the underlying values are largely unknown." (Druckman, et.al,
1988, p. 490) In Fisher's (1964) interests-first negotiating process, he referred to
this separation of values from interests as fractionating conflict. (Druckman, et. al,
1988, p. 491)
5. Goal Conflict
Goal conflict arises when the participants in a negotiation desire two
separate outcomes or consequences which are incompatible. "Goal conflict
[reflects] the degree of competition for payoffs." (Cosier & Rose, 1977, p. 378)
Position-based negotiation accepts goal conflict as inherent; interest-based
negotiation does not. For example, two advertising executives from the same
company pitch their ideas to a client, knowing that the sole upcoming promotion
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will go to the person who's idea is chosen. Since both executives desire the
promotion, they are facing goal conflict. Generally, the underlying factor in goal
conflict is the desire to achieve some specific ends of a resource allocation plan.
6. Conflict of Interest
Conflicts of interests arise when parties find themselves vying for the same
resources, and each party prefers to allocate those resources differently. "When
each party, sharing the same understanding of the situation, prefers a different and
somewhat incompatible solution to a problem involving either a distribution of
scarce resources between them or a decision to share the work of solving it."
(Rahim, 1992, cited Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973, p. 450) For example,
throughout the past several decades, the two political parties have played out a
conflict of interest in the United States Congress. In deciding what portion of the
Federal budget to cut, the Democrats have principally opted to cut defense
spending; the Republicans, entitlements. Although they are typically played out in
either an all-or-none, or zero-sum game, conflicts of interests can often be resolved
through interest-based negotiation. The "Ugh Orange" problem 1 is a classic
example of a conflict of interest resolved through integrative means. Fisher's four
step model offers an excellent approach for treating conflicts of interests as mutual
problems to be solved.
7. Cognitive Conflict
Cognitive conflict is an awareness that two parties are using the same data
or information and arrive at different conclusions. "In its extreme form, two
parties' inferences from the same data are logical contradictions of one another."
(Rahim, 1992, cited Cosier & Rose, 1977, p. 378) For example, even though both
1
In the "Ugli Orange" problem, two doctors are negotiating to buy Ugli Oranges on behalf of their
medical research companies. The Ugh Orange is special, but in short supply. One doctor needs the Ugli
Orange to prevent birth defects; the other, to develop an antidote for a nerve agent that terrorists are soon
likely to deploy. Each doctor believes his cause should receive the highest priority. Through integrative
bargaining and creative thinking, the doctors can achieve a pareto efficient solution. (Solution withheld
for the benefit of some readers)
77
groups used the same aerial photos of the million man march, the Nation of Islam
and the National Park Service reported different figures in their estimates of
attendance levels. Different methods of reasoning and different capacities to
reason (or ignorance and error) are the overarching factors in cognitive conflict. 2
8. Substantive Conflict
Substantive conflict arises when the parties disagree on what the issues are.
Whether or not their campaign rhetoric genuinely reflected their personal beliefs,
the 1992 presidential campaign presented an easy-to-understand example of
substantive conflict. For President Bush the central issue of the election was
character; for then Governor Clinton, the economy. It was their debate over what
the issues were which suggested substantive conflict. Where the two disagreed
on the facts concerning the economy (or even the Governor's character), they were
engaged in another type conflict. Again, where the conflict centers around a
disagreement over what the issues are—issues sometimes yet to be argued—the
parties involved are dealing with substantive conflict.
9. Retributive Conflict
Retributive conflict emerges from the need to punish an opponent, or seek
retribution. For example, a small business concern might allege that despite their
being the lowest bidder, a contracting officer has improperly awarded a contract to
another company. Suppose the contracting officer defends his position with clear
logic, sound legal points, and a smug attitude. Even though the small contractor
understands that the award was proper, he or she might elect to lodge a protest just
to inconvenience the contracting officer. This conflict is strictly retributive. In the
We can conclude from Rahim that incompatible degrees of cognitive complexity can create conflict. As
we discussed in Chapter HI, cognitive complexity was found to be lowest in cooperatives, medium in
competitives, then highest in exploitatives. This research did not address the interest-based approach,
which undoubtedly requires the greatest degree of cognitive complexity.
Substantive conflict is very similar to issue conflict, which occurs when two or more organizational
members disagree on the solution to a specific problem.
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vernacular, we commonly refer to retributive conflict as "having a bone to pick
with someone."
10. Misattributed Conflict
"Misattributed conflict relates to the incorrect assignment of causes
(behaviors, parties, or issues) to conflict." (Rahim, 1992, p. 21, cited Deutsch,
1977). For example, in the 1980s the increasingly conservative American voter
fought to cut "welfare" entitlements because the Federal deficit was fast becoming
unmanageable. In fact, at the end of the Reagan-Bush years, welfare spending
accounted for approximately 1 1.6 percent of the budget expenditures, while Social
Security and Medicare accounted for nearly 35.8 percent.4(Cahill, 1992) In 1994,
the Republicans enjoyed extraordinary gains and took control of the Congress.
Claiming their mandate to implement the "Contract with America," the
Republicans marked welfare for reform, largely at the behest of an uninformed
public. Misattributed conflict typically involves one or more parties jumping to
conclusions. Said another way, when a party intentionally creates a misattributed
conflict, we commonly refer to it as "scapegoating."
11. Displaced Conflict
Displaced conflict involves two types of problems. First, conflict can be
displaced and misdirected towards an "innocent bystander." In other words, the
real conflict is with some other party. For example, people often have
disagreements with their employers. Since employers have a great deal of power
over their employees, the employees often keep quiet. This situation sets the
employee up to attack the first person who comes along, e.g., a spouse, the waiter,
a co-worker. A second way in which conflict is displaced is when parties argue
over inconsequential issues in order to avoid the real issue. For example, a couple
4
Cahill's listing of Major Entitlement Programs in FY 1992 showed social security and Medicare at 58.3
percent of mandatory spending; welfare (grants to states for Medicaid, food stamp program, supplemental
security income program, family support payments to states [including Aid to Families with Dependent
Children], earned income tax credit[s], and state child nutrition payments) at 19 percent of mandatory
spending. The researcher estimated mandatory spending at 61 percent of Federal budget.
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might argue vigorously over their next vacation site, when their real concern is the
unresolved issue of an impending visit from one of their parents.
C. SUMMARY
The sources of conflict establish a framework for examining the antecedent
conditions to conflict; it is conflict which brings about the need for negotiation.
The specific sources of conflict lay out the battle ground of the dispute—the battle
ground of values, goals, tensions, hostilities, means, ends, understanding,
perception, or emotion. If the integrative approach can be seen as a process for
removing conflict, then the cross-over factor is some activity or condition which
removes or alleviates conflict. Accordingly, the antecedent to the position-based
to interest-based cross-over factor is the emergence of conflict. Conversely, if the
distributive approach can be seen as a process for maximizing payoff according to
a zero-sum perspective, then its cross-over factor is some condition which fixes
differences. The antecedent to the interest-based to position-based cross-over is
the emergence of some incentive impelling the parties to take control in the
process of determining their portion of a gain. These are the antecedents to the
cross-over factors in a general sense. Again, the intent here is not to present the
antecedents to the cross-over factors previously listed since these factors may
come in and out of vogue . Recent history from the study of leadership has shown
this to be the case when scholars pursued the character traits of "the great man"
only to abandon this futile pursuit after the list became limitless. (Heilbrunn, 1994,
66-7) From a broader perspective, the concept of antecedent conditions is brought
out in the sources of conflict and their various contests over resources, values,
goals, meaning, etc.
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VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLES BEHIND CROSS-OVER
FACTORS
A. UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATOR ORIENTATION THROUGH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CROSS-OVER FACTORS
Knowledge of the cross-over factors and their mechanisms can help
researchers understand negotiator orientation. Through a re-examination of those
cross-over factors gleaned from the several studies, we can draw some conclusions
concerning Dant and Schul's classes which characterize the cross-over factors, i.e.,
issue characteristics, relationship characteristics, structural characteristics, and
their ability to resolve specific types of conflicts. Using their framework, this
section outlines these considerations to demonstrate the insight we might gain into
negotiator orientation through a better understanding of cross-over factors.
1. Cross-over Factors Among the Issue Characteristics
As Dant and Schul (1992) reported, high stakes or a high investment of
resources merits a higher investment of time. They reasoned that since the
integrative approach typically requires more time than the distributive approach,
high stakes negotiations had a better chance of being integrative. They also
reported that negotiators who deal with extremely complex issues will favor
problem-solving and persuasion over bargaining and politicking; complexity has
the inherent capacity to provide more options and more alternatives. Perhaps these
findings suggest that the enormity of high stakes and high complexity
arrangements brings about a higher level of commitment. If this conclusion is
correct, then we can look for other factors which increase commitment. Once our
counterparts increase their commitment—their investment in resources, their time,
their energy, their concern—they will tend to justify their efforts to work out some
solution. In fact, the more time our counterparts spend talking with us in an effort
to make some sort of deal, the more they commit to the process of negotiation, and
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the more they have invested in coming to an agreement. Put simply, the more we
invest in a negotiation, the more we will justify the relationship. (Aronson, 1984,
pp. 113-181) "When a person rationalizes, he is interpreting a situation in a
manner that will place him in the most favorable light." (Nierenberg, 1986, p. 38)
Accordingly, negotiators will justify their expenditure of time and resources; they
will come to believe that the deal and the relationship are worth the greater
investment; they will then do those things which support that relationship; those
things which they will do tend to promote an integrative approach.
Johnston (1982) suggested that negotiations would be more collaborative
when negotiators enjoy mutual comprehension and when they make similar
appraisals of their communications. This common understanding or "meeting of
the minds" presupposes the lack of some conceptual conflict, i.e., cognitive,
substantive, affective conflicts, conflicts of interests or values. Johnston further
suggests that negotiations would be more collaborative when the organization
demanded higher quality of products or more informed discussion about the job.
When the organizational goals require greater interaction, involvement, and input
from its members the organization is likely to de-emphasize conflict and promote
organizational alignment. To this end the members of the organization will tend to
work out a common understanding of common problems through more persuasive
methods, i.e., problem-solving and persuasion. Those cross-over factors dealing
with issue characteristics help us rationalize (or justify) or help us develop a
common understanding to resolve conceptual conflicts.
2. Cross-over Factors Among the Relationship Characteristics
As Dant and Schul (1992) reported, a high functionality of conflict, or
mutual ability to determine one another's future, helps reduce the concern for
placing controls on our counterpart. They also reported that a high degree of
relationalism and high frequency of contact typically engender substantial
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interaction and responsiveness between parties. This substantial interaction
facilitates communication and information exchange. Lastly, we should expect
that a high degree of trust helps build the type of relationship characterized by
information exchange and openness to influence; moreover, it is self-perpetuating;
trust begets trust . The Zand (1971) model suggests that these relationship factors
will exhibit spiral reinforcement. Again, the reduced concern for controlling
others, increased information exchange, and increased trust—which we should
expect from these factors—support the Zand model. Knowledge of these cross-
over factors suggests a specific approach to applying the principles of spiral
reinforcement. Moreover, knowledge of these cross-over factors tells us
something about the type of relationship required to stabilize either orientation.
For interest-based negotiations, we must proceed independent of trust;
however, our trustworthiness is important in building the relationship, facilitating
information exchange, and reducing controls. Information exchange is the vital
process in the effort to uncover underlying interests and needs; it is the very
process through which we expose the rationale behind our perspectives and
discover the true sources of conflict. Our being open to persuasion and open to
influence is another important aspect of interest-based negotiation. Our openness
to persuasion allows us to appreciate our counterpart's reasoning, values, and
emotions; it allows us to compare our own reasoning, etc., and flesh out the
underlying source of conflict. Our openness to persuasion ultimately allows us to
hear the specific reasons, values, and emotions, etc., which present a source of
conflict. Once we have heard our counterpart's perspective, we can choose to
modify our own attitudes in light of this new perspective, or we can work to
influence our counterpart, or we can come to some third solution which dovetails
both perspectives and ultimately addresses both concerns.
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Together, our trastworthiness and high incidents of refraining further
promote an approach where negotiators can underscore their common interests and
de-emphasize their differences. An atmosphere of trust, a climate which supports
our capacity to accept influence, is critical to fostering the parties' efforts to
reframe issues. Cynically viewed, refraining is nothing more than "spin-
doctoring," hedging, quibbling, or deception, thus the trusting atmosphere plays a
principle role in the parties' resolving to appreciate and engage in refraining. The
cross-over factors we find among the relationship characteristics underscore the
common concern for building trust. These factors are well suited to deal with the
nature of nonrealistic conflicts, i.e., the displaced, misattributed, and retributive
conflict. Since these factors are able to facilitate interest-based negotiations (or at
least cooperative negotiations); since they alleviate nonrealistic conflicts, we might
conclude that the nature of the interest-based negotiator orientation is one focused
on resolving realistic conflict and handling nonrealistic conflicts before they
damage the relationship.
3. Cross-over Factors Among the Environmental Characteristics
High uncertainty may drive two or more would-be adversaries together for
the sake of survival, on the other hand, high munificence (generosity), and
friendliness during discussions help forge a relationship because negotiators find
that dealing with one another is pleasurable. (Dant and Schul, 1992; Johnston,
1982) When negotiators increase the amount of communication among them—
particularly when they use more active listening to achieve understanding—they
activate the forces of spiral reinforcement. When negotiators come together—when
they organize towards goals, display a willingness to implement suggestions, and
give increased attentiveness to other members who have come together—who have
organized to deal with some problem through negotiation, these negotiators have
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created an environment which facilitates communication and supports spiral
reinforcement. (Johnston, 1982; Zand, 1971)
Lastly, Johnston (1982, p. 163) suggested that internal or external
motivation to achieve goals promotes collaboration. Here Johnston implied that
goal setting is the substantial element in selecting the interest-based orientation
regardless of whether the motivation comes from an internal or external source.
As we will consider in the next section, external motivation can be principally
compliance based, i.e., focusing on rewards and punishment. These methods of
eliciting conformity are fleeting. They fail to tap into needs beyond self-interest.
They support a mind-set of pay-off maximization and position-based transactions.
However, when an external motivation factor focuses on goal setting, it employs
higher methods of eliciting conformity, such as identification or internalization. 1
The environmental cross-over factors emphasize the elements of trust and
cooperation Where nonrealistic conflicts are at the root of a dispute, these cross-
over factors create an environment which helps negotiators build a relationship
with one another.
4. Cross-over Factors Among the Structural Characteristics
High organizational integration, better coordination of efforts, better
division of labor, equitable distribution of work, and increased productivity per
unit of time help improve the negotiator's capacity to deal with issues efficiently.
(Johnston, 1982) The improved efficiencies realized from these activities justifies
the effort required to support the integrative approach. These factors help resolve
or even prevent the problems which typically arise from realistic conflict. For
instance, we expect the equitable distribution of work to forestall most disputes
involving the burdens placed on a certain person. In negotiations, we would
expect the equitable distribution of work to arrest the unraveling of an agreement
1
Compliance, Identification, and Internalization are the three modes through which we may elicit
conformity according to Aronson (1984). The next section addresses conformity in greater length.
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nearing its completion—an unraveling which might otherwise occur if one party
felt that it was unfairly burdened with the work of bringing about an agreement.
Simply put, the factors presented in this section help form integrative agreements
which might otherwise be abandoned as too hard to do. Where negotiations might
otherwise contain several sources of conflict or an extremely complex issue, these
structural factors enable the parties to begin resolving the conflict before it
escalates—as the parties establish the structure of their meetings, rules, teams, etc.
5. Cross-over Factors Among the Personality Characteristics
Of the myriad of possible personality characteristics, the literature deals
with only a small number of personality traits. Even so, our current understanding
of personality provides little insight into the outcomes we can expect to realize
when we mix different people in different situations. Personality has a profound
yet indeterminate affect on negotiations. Often times, a personality trait requires a
certain catalyst in order for it to become a factor in a negotiation. For example,
experienced negotiators who are otherwise quick to anger typically learn to
exercise self-control. Although, they may rarely become angry during
negotiations, the right catalyst may activate their true personality traits and cause
these negotiators to make atypical choices out of anger. (Lamm, 1997) These true
personality traits, such as extroversion, suspiciousness, acrimony, etc., often
require a catalyst to activate them if our counterparts choose not to be themselves.
In such cases, true personality traits can work as latent cross-over factors; we
cannot endow a person with a hot temper, we can only activate that existing
endowment. Latent cross-over factors are permanent or relatively permanent
character traits which bring about a specific negotiator orientation under certain
conditions. These conditions, or catalysts, could also be considered cross-over
factors, but we must address the latent factor in order to adequately identify
qualities which have bearing on negotiator orientation.
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On the other hand, emotions or sentiments are less permanent than
personality traits. Emotions or sentiments can be changed and thus a cross-over
initiated. Hermann and Kogan, and others list some traits which are less
permanent than the type outlined above. For instance, anxiety is situational. It can
be mitigated or induced. Cognitive complexity and similarity with our counterpart
are also situational. High cognitive complexity is situational, but relatively
fixed. The degree of cognitive complexity an individual holds is situational in the
sense that it may vary according to subject matter; it is fixed in the sense that it
remains fairly constant over a long period of time. For example, the late President
Nixon displayed an extraordinary degree of cognitive complexity in matters of
geopolitical strategy, thus he proved to be a masterful negotiator in matters of
diplomacy. His cognitive complexity was much lower in the area of mechanical
devises—as we might conclude from his ill-fated tape-recording fiasco.
(Haldeman, 1994, p. 680) Accordingly, we would not expect him to demonstrate
the same degree of prowess as a negotiator for weapon systems. Cognitive
complexity is an example of a personality trait which is predominantly situation-
dependent, yet a part of an individual's permanent psychological endowment.
Anxiety is an example of a transitive personality trait or emotion that is
fairly easy to activate. While individuals are endowed with the propensity to
exhibit a certain degree of anxiety, conditions of the negotiation can easily fuel the
levels of anxiety that parties hold. As we have seen in the three examples,
personality traits can be categorized as latent cross-over factors, situational-fixed,
or transitive. Latent cross-over factors are permanent or relatively permanent
2
The fiasco in question is the famous 18 minute gap of tape recording which alerted many to the
extensive cover up of the Watergate scandal. Haldeman in his book, The Ends of Power, attributed the
clumsy recording gap to Nixon, who was known to be not mechanically inclined.
3 Of course Nixon did serve in World War II as a Naval supply officer. He may have proven to be a
capable weapon system negotiator, but the point to be made here is that as a statesman—due largely to his
gift for geopolitical strategy and his cognitive complexity—his negotiating skills were nonpareil.
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character traits which must be activated by certain conditions or catalysts.
Situational-fixed cross-over factors are propensities, and not necessary character
traits. These are less susceptible to the dynamics of a negotiation; they are
relatively fixed for a given scenario. Transitive cross-over factors are emotional
states which are relatively easy to activate.
6. Summary of the Analysis of Cross-over Factors
Dant and Schul's framework bring about greater insight into the negotiator
orientation through a better understanding of cross-over factors. Our grasp of
issue characteristics suggests that negotiators will justify their expenditure of time
and resources, ultimately leading them to do those things which promote an
integrative approach. The cross-over factors we find among the relationship
characteristics underscore the common concern for building trust and suggest that
greater interaction and involvement from parties tends to de-emphasize conflict
and promote organizational alignment Environmental factors which facilitate
communication support a positive spiral reinforcement. Also when the
environment provides external motivation factors which focus on goal setting, it
employs higher methods of ehciting conformity. Where the sources of conflict
involve high complexity, structural factors enable the parties to begin resolving the
conflict before it escalates.
B. CROSS-OVER FACTORS OR CROSS-OVER PRINCIPLES?
The research of Dant and Schul (1992), Johnston (1982), and Hermann and
Kogan (1977) has provided several candidates from which we might identify
cross-over factors—actions, or traits capable of causing latent action, which cause
negotiators to shift their orientation from position-based to interest-based or vice
versa. These studies represent a collection of theories drawn from research on
specific factors or variables thought to make negotiations more cooperative or
collaborative, or thought to foster the problem-solving and persuasive styles of
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conflict management. These studies have taken an essentially reductionist
approach to identifying certain variables—isolating them in a controlled experiment
and ignoring the complexity of human interaction. To make sense of the many
exceptions to the rules, experts were asked to validate or refute the many factors.
To make further sense of these several theories—to achieve synthesis—the cross-
over factors were examined against the framework of social influence and existing
models supporting the notion of a cross-over dynamic.
1. Sanctions: the Tit-for-Tat Principle
Chapter III presented several models and theories which demonstrated the
cross-over dynamic. Among those concepts, both the Tit-for-Tat and GRIT
theories applied the principle of employing sanctions. In the Tit-for-Tat model,
each party has the power to repay the other tit-for-tat, in other words, parties have
the power to sanction one another. Since sanctions present one of the simplest
means of controlling behavior, Tit-for-Tat and similar theories are easy to
comprehend and employ.
Negotiators exercise reward power with their counterparts by validating
their actions, furnishing resources, or withholding punishments. By validating
their counterpart's actions, their objective is to take a leadership role and affirm
our counterpart's good behavior. When negotiators are truthful and accepted as
trustworthy, they can validate their counterpart and increase the others'
appreciation of them. (Aronson, 1984, pp. 286) Accordingly, the other negotiator
is more likely to be open to influence, at least on the unimportant issues.
(Aronson, 1984, p. 81) Even more important, validation is a more positive way to
practice Tit-for-Tat than repaying harm. (Lamm, 1991) Negotiators may employ a
range of material rewards to encourage positive behavior or a favorable concession
of positions. Negotiators may repay their counterpart's concession with some
concession of resource of their own; they may reward positive behavior. Again in
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Tit-for-Tat, the sole method for achieving compliance is through the application of
sanctions: rewards and punishments.
2. Identification
Although, none of the models apply the principle of identification, its use
has strong potential in creating conformity to a specific negotiator orientation.
"Conformity can be defined as a change in a person's behavior or opinions as a
result of real or imagined pressure from a person or group of people." (Aronson,
1984, p. 17) Conformity, as Aronson outlines it, denotes three types of social
influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. Identification is a type
of behavior adopted to relate to a person or group of people. For example,
mothers of past generations might have cajoled young boys to eat their spinach
because "Popeye eats his spinach—and you want to grow up to be strong like
Popeye." Identification as a mode of influence is not intrinsically satisfying; as
Aronson wrote, "...he (any individual) adopts a particular behavior because it puts
him in a satisfying relationship to the person or persons with whom he is
identifying." (Aronson, 1984, p. 32) Like compliance, identification relies on
extrinsic rewards or punishments, but with identification, the reinforcement
schedule becomes less significant. To use another example, suppose a young boy,
John, is asked to clean his room, and suppose John developed an attachment to—
began to identify with—a sloppy television character, for instance, Theo Huxtable
of the Cosby show. If his identification with Theo becomes more important that
the nickel his parents give him for cleaning his room, then he is less likely to
comply when they ask him to clean up his room. If the nickel (and perhaps the
praise they give him when they reward him) is more important than his
identification with Theo, then we would expect John to clean his room despite the
negative influence that Theo might have. If John's parents controlled his behavior
by rewarding him, and then discontinue the rewards, his behavior (cleaning his
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room) will likely extinguish. In fact, because John continues to respond to the
reward of the nickel, his parents may never learn of Theo's negative influence.
Therein lies the problem. Long after we discontinue a reinforcement schedule,
latent influences often take effect. Behavior influenced by identification is
relatively permanent compared to that caused by compliance.
3. Internalization
Internalization occurs when people adopt an attitude, belief, or behavior
because they believe they are right. Aronson presented several findings in a
chapter on self-justification to support his conclusion that the desire to be right
represents an extremely powerful motive. "The motivation to internalize a
particular belief is the desire to be right. Thus the reward for the belief is intrinsic.
If the person who provides the influence is perceived to be trustworthy and of
good judgment, we accept the belief he or she advocates and we integrate it into
our system of values." (Aronson, 1984, p. 33) Aronson stated that the critical
component of the internalization process is competence; however, the passage
cited also suggests that trustworthiness has a substantial affect on internalization.
Covey also prescribed tmstworthiness for the principle-centered leader.
"Trustworthiness is more than integrity; it also connotes competence. In other
words, you may be an honest doctor, but before I trust you, I want to know that
you're competent as well." (Covey, 1992, p. 171)
4. Social Influence: The Principles Behind the Cyclical Model of
Transactional Exchange
When negotiators have to justify the expenditure of their resources, they
tend to select an integrative approach. When they share a common concern for
building trust, they tend to de-emphasize conflict, promote a positive spiral
reinforcement, and negotiate side-by side. The environment provides internal and
external motivation factors which focus on goal setting. Where the sources of
conflict involve high complexity, structural factors enable the parties to begin
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resolving the conflict before it escalates. Dant and Schul's framework brings
about greater insight into the negotiator orientation through a better understanding
of cross-over factors. Our knowledge of psychology has roots in both classical
behaviorism and humanism. The substantial body of knowledge emerging from
studies in behaviorism supports our understanding of compliance as a mode of
social influence. The scientific methodology has also yielded findings which help
us understand some of the phenomena of our human social systems, e.g.,




The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions, the
recommendations, the research questions, and suggestions for further study.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Validity of the Researcher's Proposed Model
Based on the presence of similar concepts in several other theories and
models, we can conclude that the researcher's model has content validity. This
content validity was established in Chapters II and III. A review of the literature
uncovered several other models or theories which supported the idea of a cross-
over dynamic, but the proposed model serves uniquely as a process-focus model,
since it highlights the differences between the focus of a position-based
negotiation and the focus of an interest-based negotiation. The researcher's model
in Figure 1 demonstrates an existing pathway by which a set of cross over factors
causes negotiations to vacillate between distributive and integrative processes-
negotiators move from their concern for their own respective positions to their
concern for the underlying interests involved, or vice-versa. From the model, we
can also conclude that negotiation can be seen as a cyclical process of
transactional exchange among parties seeking to fulfill their sets of needs through
social influence.
2. The Cross-over Dynamic
The survey of the literature and the presentation of the several related
models support the notion that the cross-over dynamic does exist. Once applied to
a continuum, March and Simon's taxonomy of the organizational reaction to
conflict characterized the shift in negotiator orientations in a manner consistent
with other research findings. Specifically, negotiator orientation moves or
vacillates along a continuum.
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3. The List of Cross-over Factors
The cross-over factors previously listed are only a sample of the conditions
that will cause negotiators to vacillate between the two extremes: position-based
and interest-based negotiation. These factors may come in and out of popularity,
but the principles behind them demonstrate the mechanisms through which the
cross-over dynamic works. Recent history from the study of leadership has shown
this to be the case when scholars pursued the character traits of the "great man"
only to abandon this futile pursuit after the list became limitless. (Heilbrunn, 1994,
66-7) From a broader perspective, the concept of antecedent conditions is brought
out in the sources of conflict and their various contests over resources, values,
goals, meaning, etc.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Concepts and Theories for Training and Education
Educators should present the models, concepts, and theories concerned with
interest-based negotiations. First, a basic understanding of interest-based
negotiation should become a part of the education of students in Systems
Management, particularly the Acquisition and Contract Management (815)
curriculum. In an era of sharpening budgetary constraints, dynamic technical
complexity, and changing business relationships, military officers should be
educated to take a leadership role as problem-solvers in civilian-military teaming
arrangements, while upholding the public trust that they will minimize the burden
on the tax payer.
2. Reading List
Educators, students, and professional negotiators should familiarize
themselves with the principles of interest-based negotiation and psychology.
According to the Harvard Negotiation Project, psychology is the least understood
of the disciplines which support the study of negotiation—this important discipline
is the next frontier in that study. To this end the researcher has developed the
reading list in the appendix.
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3. Distribution
After this work is published, the distribution list should be amended to
provide ample copies to students of the Pricing and Negotiation course, MN 3304,
and the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department of the Naval Postgraduate
School. The recommended distribution to support this requirement is as follows:
five to Dr. D. V. Lamm (815)
one to NSA or the Marine Corps Representative (NSA Department
Instructor
D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This section presents a summary of the answers to the research questions.
Subsection 1 presents the primary research question. Subsections 2 through 6
present the subsidiary research questions.
1. Primary Question: To What Extent Do Cross-Over Factors
Between Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Processes Exist
and How Might Such Factors Affect Negotiator Orientation?
Research supports the notion that cross-over factors exist between the
distributive and integrative negotiation processes. Dant and Schul's study report
several research findings which showed that many of the cross-over factors named
in this work impelled organizations to employ specific conflict management styles.
Those factors which fostered problem-solving and persuasion were included as
cross-over factors since problem-solving and persuasion are essentially integrative
approaches.
These cross-over factors affect negotiator orientation and behavior by
changing the issues, relationships, the structure, the environment, or the emotional
climate of the negotiation. While some cross-over factors deliver an immediate
impact on negotiator orientation, other demonstrate a latent effect. Negotiators
often enter into a negotiation with a strategic intention which differs from their
natural inclination. In these instances, certain cross-over factors can unsettle even
experienced negotiators—undermine their strategy—causing them to react in a
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manner more typical of their own human nature. When that reactive human nature
is dominated by some previously undisclosed personality trait, we can view that
trait as a latent cross-over factor. Some other condition, either planned or
accidental, prominent or benign, works as a catalyst to activate the latent cross-
over factor.
2. What are Distributive and Integrative Negotiations?
Integrative or interest-based negotiation is a distinct subset of cooperative
negotiation. It involves a high degree of informational exchange aimed at mutual
problem-solving. It is characterized by interactions which facilitate relatively
higher levels of trust than would be found in other negotiations. Cooperative
negotiations entail a broad set of negotiations where parties accommodate their
counterparts' efforts to explore their own needs. In cooperative negotiations, the
parties are more open to persuasion. In distributive or position-based negotiations,
parties typically focus on some plan of action or objective to fulfill their sets of
needs. The effort to secure some agreement focuses on these objectives, or
positions, and not on the parties' overall concerns or interests. In position-based
negotiations, parties can work either cooperatively or competitively. Position-
based negotiators typically view differences as fixed; they see the agreement as the
conclusion of some zero sum contest and focus on obtaining some desired portion
of gains.
3. Do Negotiations Vacillate Between the Distributive and
Integrative Cycles of the Model?
Chapter III presented several existing models to support the contention that
negotiations indeed vacillate between the distributive and integrative cycles of the
researcher's model. Organizational Reaction to Conflict showed that
organizations tend to have their own unique climates. These climates cultivate
certain conflict management behaviors in the organization's members. Tit-for-Tat
represents a simple "eye for an eye" or quid pro quo strategy. It does little to
promote the actual cross-over to interest-based or cooperative negotiation.
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Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension-reduction (GRIT) , like Tit-for-
Tat, is a responsive strategy. GRIT elicits the cross-over by communicating
cooperative intent and using a modified tit-for-tat. The Triangle Model is a
perception model, which proposes that position-based negotiators see their
counterparts as capable of position-based negotiating only while interest-based
negotiators tend to see their counterparts as being capable of either position- or
interest-based negotiation. The triangle model provides cross-over insight; through
it we realize that we can foster the cross-over to interest-based negotiation by
explaining how it works. The Spiral Reinforcement Model demonstrates how
restricting information, resisting influence, and seeking to impose controls can
generate a downward spiral of mistrust. On the other hand, sharing information
and building trust combine synergistically, and they are fundamentally the most
important activities of a negotiation, particularly in interest-based negotiations.
The Crude Law of Social Relations has three tenets which outline the dynamics
between the climate of the organization and the orientation of the individual
negotiators. The first tenet supports March and Simon's Organizational Reaction
to Conflict; the second, Zand's Spiral Reinforcement Model. The third tenet
supports the underlying premises of the researcher's cross-over model, that: a
firmly developed atmosphere will be readily changed should one party act
deliberately and clearly in a manner contradictory to the existing atmosphere. Five
Conflict Handling Modes presented a dual concern model which showed that the
cardinal personality factors in negotiarion-assertiveness and cooperation—were
not mutually exclusive polar opposites. These seven models and concepts detail
various mechanisms by which negotiators cross-over from a position-based to an
interest-based orientation and vice versa.
4. Does a Set of Common Cross-Over Factors Exist?
Several factors have been identified which promote interest-based
negotiation. These factors are held to be generic or common cross-over factors-
appropriate regardless of the profession of the negotiator. Factors from the Dant
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and Schul study were presented from research findings which compared the
tendency to use problem-solving and persuasion with the tendency to use
bargaining and politicking. Dant and Schul also provide a useful framework in






While not supported by research findings, the factors taken from the Johnston
article offer solid behaviors or action items that negotiators can implement to
promote the cross-over in orientations. The Hermann and Kogan study reports the
research findings concerning eight personality characteristics which engender the
shift in negotiator orientation. Key factors from other studies were also presented
as cross-over factors. The cross-over factors from the various studies can have
action in the present or latent action. The repressed endowments of personality
often serve as latent cross-over factors.
5. What are the Antecedents to these Cross-Over Factors?
The sources of conflict establish a framework for examining the antecedent
conditions to conflict; it is conflict which brings about the need for negotiation.
The specific sources of conflict lay out the battle ground of the dispute—the battle
ground of values, goals, tensions, hostilities, means, ends, understanding,
perception, or emotion. If the integrative approach can be seen as a process for
removing conflict, then the cross-over factor is some activity or condition which
removes or alleviates conflict. Accordingly, the antecedent to the position-based
to interest-based cross-over factor is the emergence of conflict. Conversely, if the
distributive approach can be seen as a process for maximizing payoff according to
a zero-sum perspective, then its cross-over factor is some condition which fixes
differences. The antecedent to the interest-based to position-based cross-over is
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the emergence of some incentive impelling the parties to take control in the
process of determining their portion of a gain. These are the antecedents to the
cross over factors in a general sense. From a broader perspective, the concept of
antecedent conditions is brought out in the sources of conflict and their various
contests over resources, values, goals, meaning, etc.
6. How Might Knowledge of these Factors Assist in Understanding
Negotiator Orientation?
The cross-over factors from specific research findings and Dant and Schul's
framework generate a greater understanding of negotiator orientation. The set of
factors characterized by issues show that once negotiators have justified the
expenditure of their resources, they tend to select an integrative approach.
Relationship-building cross-over factors show that when negotiators share a
common concern for building trust, they tend to de-emphasize conflict, promote a
positive spiral reinforcement, and negotiate side-by-side. When the environment
provides internal and external motivation factors which focus of goal setting, we
can expect the distributive to integrative cross-over. Where the sources of conflict
involve high complexity, structural factors enable the parties to begin resolving the
conflict before it escalates. A number of cross-over factors appear to gain their
effectiveness by managing or contributing to: (1) the commitment of resources, (2)
trust, (3) goal-setting, and (4) the complexity of issues.
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Further Study of Johnston's Factors
Johnston (1982, p. 164) presented ten factors which he suggested would
shift negotiations from competitive to collaborative; however, he does not offer
data or evidence from research findings to support his contentions. Yet compared
with Dant and Schul, or Hermann and Kogan, Johnston's factors stand out as
descriptive—and prescriptive—concrete conditions which establish an
organizational climate supportive of interest-based negotiation. Accordingly,
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future research should be conducted to determine if any correlation between
Johnston's factors and the integrative cycle exists.
2. Further Study of Anxiety, Cognitive Complexity, and Self-Esteem
from Hermann and Kogan's Factors
Hermann and Kogan's study presented eight personality factors which the
researcher framed as potential cross-over factors. Specifically, the authors
reviewed the literature and designed an experiment to determine which groups
competitives, cooperatives, or exploitatives were more likely to exhibit particular
factors. Although the authors reported high anxiety, low cognitive complexity,
and low self-esteem, as consistent with cooperatives, the researcher considered
these findings to be suspect; the authors' literature review was inconclusive, and
experts also disagreed. (Lamm, 1997; Lewicki, 1997) Accordingly, further
research should be conducted using the prisoner's dilemma model to determine the
repeatability of Dant and Schul's findings.
3. Further Study in Computer Modeling in Interest-based
Negotiation
Further research should be conducted in computer modeling. Specifically,
software-assisted simulation models may help determine the true relationships
among the set of potential cross-over factors. Contractors such as Phred
Development, Inc., have expanded their business support software services to
include current efforts to support interest-based negotiation.
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